Un politiķi (kāds miličiem ar to sakars?) neņems vērā privātos uzņēmējus, jo? Starptautiskajās {tiesībās, attiecībās} ir rinda piemēru, kur ekonomiskās sankcijas devušas rezultātus; piemērs—ASV vadītais embargo pret Dominikas Republiku (laika periods 1960–62) beidzās ar Trujillo režīma nomaiņu (Wallensteen 1968, 1971).

No kurienes ideja, ka ekonomisko sankciju vienīgais mērķis ir gāzt režīmus? Paskatieties uz kādiem legāliem pamatiem, piemēram, Eiropas Savienība piemēro sankcijas. Jā, sankcijas pret Irāku var uzskatīt ne tikai par izgāšanos, bet arī par humanitāru katastrofu (cf. Infant and child death rates). Tāpat, ir veiksmes un uzvaras militārās operācijās, karos; ir kari, ko jāuzskata par neveiksmēm. Nu un? Ja ir vērts apskatīt starptautiskās politikas instrumentus, tad tikai runājot par konkrētiem gadījumiem, nevis paziņot, ka tas un tas instruments nestrādā, ja ir virkne pretpiemēru.

The United States currently maintains the following economic sanctions against China:

• limits on U.S. foreign assistance;
• U.S. “No” votes or abstention in the international banks;
• ban on Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs;
• ban on export of defense articles or defense services;
• ban on import of munitions or ammunition;
• denial of Generalized System of Preferences status;
• substantial export controls on dual-use items, particularly satellites, nuclear technology, and computers;
• export and licensing restrictions on targeted entities found to have engaged in proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (or related technology); and
• Presidential authority to restrict Chinese military companies and Chinese government-affiliated businesses from developing commercial activities inside the United States.

KĀDU TRUJILLO VALDĪBU? VISI, KAS KAUT KO SAPROT NO VIŅA REŽĪMA, NEKAUTRĒSIES TEV PATEIKT, KA VIŅŠ VALDĪJA VIENBALSĪGI. KĀDA STARPĪBA, KA TRUJILLO BIJA NEAPMIERINĀTS AR SANKCIJĀM (TĀ PAT, KĀ AR TO BIJA NEAPMIERINĀTI VIŅA PĒCTEČI), JA REZULTĀTĀ SANKCIJU MĒRĶIS TIKA SASNIEGTS — VALSTĪ IELAIDA NEATKARĪGUS NOVĒROTĀJUS UN BALAGUER PAKĻĀVĀS ATSEVIŠĶĀM PRASĪBĀM TĀ PADAROT KOPĒJO, VISPĀRĪGO IEDZĪVOTĀJU STĀVOKLI LABĀKU?

Pie tā arī palieku. Ekonomiskās sanckijas veicināja "civil unrest", un pretēji tavam apgalvojumam par "3 biedriem, sazvērniekiem", disidentu kustība bija krietni daudzskaitlīgāka. Jūtot starptautisko atbalstu, kas vājināja arī Trojilla ģimenes rocību, viņiem bija pamudinājums. Protams, žēl, ka rezultāti nebija tūlītēji un prasīja vēl daudz ASV ārpolitiķu darba.

[T]he sugar boycott hurt, particulary because the Trujillo family owned most of the Dominican sugar plantations.

The United States, the Organization of American States, and the Dominican Republic, 1961–1963 
Author(s): Jerome Slater 
Source: International Organization, Vol. 18, No. 2, (Spring, 1964), pp. 268-291 
Published by: Cambridge University Press 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2705323 
Accessed: 24/05/2008 09:40 
Dokumenta lpp.: 9

[..] In the case of Trujillo, the foreign impact on his demise (both personal and political) was even more direct and dramatic. In fact, Howard Wiarda, probably the leading North American student of the Trujillo dictatorship, adjudges the pressures from the international environment to have been largely responsible for actions by the government that triggered (or at least greatly intensified) the forces that eventuated in the assassination of Trujillo in 1961 (uzsvars mans). Thus in the wake of diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic in 1960 by the Organization of American States for aggressive acts against Venezuela (i.e., the attempted assassination of President Romulo Betancourt) Trujillo began to spend lavishly for arms, in turn imposing heavy taxes on many of those who had been his chief supporters. Moreover, according to Wiarda, "the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted in bringing together the conspirators and, in later stages, may even have provided encouragement and even arms to the assassination [of Trujillo].²⁸

---

²⁸ Wiarda (1968: 171). The exact U.S. role in the assassination plot is unclear; thus there is some indication that the U.S. tried to abort the conspiracy at the last moment (see Diedrich, 1978). However, there still seems little question that the United States had withdrawn its imprimatur from Trujillo and that its actions played a major role in effecting his downfall. The primary U.S. motive seems to have been the desire to avoid "another Cuba" in the wake of reaction to a repressive dictatorship. Too, Venezuela was insistent on action against Trujillo if it was to join a united American front against Castro.

The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes 
Author(s): Robert H. Dix 
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, (Dec., 1982), pp. 554-573 
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447341 
Accessed: 24/05/2008 08:34
Dokumenta lpp.: 15

After concluding that Trujillo must be unseated, the administration contemplated several plans of action. Secretary of State Christian Herter, anxious to avoid unilateral commitment of military forces, encouraged the President to work through the OAS. Eisenhower agreed with this cautious approach, saying "we must not seek to dominate the affair, but must move very carefully, inducing the OAS to take the lead."