ro·bot (n.) 1923, from English translation of 1920 play "R.U.R." ("Rossum's Universal Robots"), by Karel Capek (1890-1938), from Czech robotnik "forced worker," from robota "forced labor, compulsory service, drudgery," from robotiti "to work, drudge," from an Old Czech source akin to Old Church Slavonic rabota "servitude," from rabu "slave," from Old Slavic orbu-, from PIE orbh- "pass from one status to another" (see orphan).
Ancient hunter-gatherers mastered a very wide variety of skills in order to survive, which is why it would be immensely difficult to design a robotic hunter-gatherer. Such a robot would have to know how to prepare spear points from flint stones, find edible mushrooms in a forest, track down a mammoth, coordinate a charge with a dozen other hunters and use medicinal herbs to bandage any wounds. However, a taxi driver or a cardiologist specializes in a much narrower niche than a hunter-gatherer, which makes it easier to replace them with AI.
As algorithms push humans out of the job market, wealth and power might become concentrated in the hands of the tiny elite that owns the all-powerful algorithms, creating unprecedented social and political inequality.
Human law already recognizes intersubjective entities like corporations and nations as “legal persons.” Though Toyota or Argentina has neither a body nor a mind, they are subject to international laws, they can own land and money, and they can sue and be sued in court. We might soon grant similar status to algorithms. An algorithm could then own a transportation empire or a venture-capital fund without having to obey the wishes of any human master.
Before dismissing the idea, remember that most of our planet is already legally owned by non-human intersubjective entities, namely nations and corporations.
In the 21st century we might witness the creation of a massive new unworking class: people devoid of any economic, political or even artistic value, who contribute nothing to the prosperity, power and glory of society.
The crucial problem isn’t creating new jobs. The crucial problem is creating new jobs that humans perform better than algorithms.
Since we do not know how the job market would look in 2030 or 2040, today we have no idea what to teach our kids. Most of what they currently learn at school will probably be irrelevant by the time they are 40. Traditionally, life has been divided into two main parts: a period of learning, followed by a period of working. Very soon this traditional model will become utterly obsolete, and the only way for humans to stay in the game will be to keep learning throughout their lives and to reinvent themselves repeatedly. Many, if not most, humans may be unable to do so. [This has already been the case for a while]
The coming technological bonanza will probably make it feasible to feed and support people even without any effort from their side. But what will keep them occupied and content? One answer might be drugs and computer games. Unnecessary people might spend increasing amounts of time within 3D virtual-reality worlds that would provide them with far more excitement and emotional engagement than the drab reality outside. Yet such a development would deal a mortal blow to the liberal belief in the sacredness of human life and of human experiences. What’s so sacred about useless bums who pass their days devouring artificial experiences?
Tikmēr Latvijā čušš, it nekas http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39
Latviešu val. etimoloģijas vārdnīcas nav tiešsaistē, AAAAAA!!!!
"If a corporation has the same rights as a person and Artificial Intelligence is a representative of said corporation, then it would be protected under the corporate person-hood umbrella."
"If you want to make big improvements in communication, my advice is – hire physicists, not communications people from normal companies and never believe what advertising companies tell you about ‘data’ unless you can independently verify it. Physics, mathematics, and computer science are domains in which there are real experts, unlike macro-economic forecasting which satisfies neither of the necessary conditions"
"Emma Briant, a propaganda specialist at the University of Sheffield, wrote about SCL Group in her 2015 book, Propaganda and Counter-Terrorism: Strategies for Global Change. Cambridge Analytica has the technological tools to effect behavioural and psychological change, she said, but it’s SCL that strategises it. It has specialised, at the highest level – for Nato, the MoD, the US state department and others – in changing the behaviour of large groups. It models mass populations and then it changes their beliefs."
"Bagehot’s theory suggests that U.S. national security policy is defined by the network of executive officials who manage the departments and agencies responsible for protecting U.S. national security and who, responding to structural incentives embedded in the U.S. political system, operate largely removed from public view and from constitutional constraints. The public believes that the constitutionally-established institutions control national security policy, but that view is mistaken.
Judicial review is negligible; congressional oversight is dysfunctional; and presidential control is nominal. Absent a more informed and engaged electorate, little possibility exists for restoring accountability in the formulation and execution of national security policy."
My Jewelry glistening why I’m always chilly
Can't believe a nigga made a couple milli'
'Bout to cop the house way up in the hillies
With a bad bitch in the Bentley
Wood grain with the roof gone
Make a bitch fold like a futon
Gettin' bread like a crouton
Tell me what the fuck is you on??
On Wednesday, Reuters reported (in great detail) how 19.5% of Rosneft, Russia’s state oil company, has been sold to parties unknown. This was done through a dizzying array of shell companies, so that the most that can be said with certainty now is that the money “paying” for it was originally loaned out to the shell layers by VTB (the government’s official bank), even though it’s highly unclear who, if anyone, would be paying that loan back; and the recipients have been traced as far as some Cayman Islands shell companies.
Why is this interesting? Because the much-maligned Steele Dossier (the one with the golden showers in it) included the statement that Putin had offered Trump 19% of Rosneft if he became president and removed sanctions. The reason this is so interesting is that the dossier said this in July, and the sale didn’t happen until early December. And 19.5% sounds an awful lot like “19% plus a brokerage commission.”
Conclusive? No. But it raises some very interesting questions for journalists to investigate.
If I am proved correct,” he said, “the Germans will call me a German, the Swiss will call me a Swiss citizen, and the French will call me a great scientist. If relativity is proved wrong, the French will call me a Swiss, the Swiss will call me a German, and the Germans will call me a Jew
Russia may seek to deploy troops in Belarus to match a NATO tank buildup in Poland. But what happens if Lukashenko says no?
Krishjaanis will dig this
“The architect, like almost every urban dweller, has no culture. He lacks the certainty of the farmer, who possesses culture. The urban dweller is an uprooted person. By culture I mean that balance of man’s inner and outer being which alone guarantees rational thought and action.”
"Russia plans to transform Belarus into an outpost for military confrontation with NATO.
Russia may use Belarusian territory in order to generate security threats to the Baltic states.
Without doubt, this is detrimental to the sovereignty and independence of the Belarusian state.
Kremlin is preparing Russian public opinion for a serious crisis in Belarusian-Russian relations.
Kremlin is angry because of Belarus's refusal to support the Kremlin's actions in Ukraine.
As well as for its resistance towards the idea of a Russian base on its territory.
Belarusian authorities are hindering the Eurasian integration project because of the oil and gas conflict.
Minsk demands a reduction in the price of gas while Russia seeks to make Belarus pay back their debt."
"The intent was to win not only the physical fight but the fight of the mind: to ensure that the will of the adversary was compelled to accept the outcome, even before the first shots were fired. Maskirovka in application would change the calculus of combat in our favor against technically superior western forces. When the shots were fired, the intelligence that drove BLUFOR targeting was imprecise enough for our key systems to survive. This I would learn was the core of the concept of Maskirovka.
Maskirovka-applied meant the inclusion of deception measures, information operations/warfare, psychological operations, and outright propaganda to influence the outcome of our battles. This also meant radio broadcasts, leaflets, false news stories planted in the rotation’s mock newspapers, influencing local leaders, and maintaining physical deception measures. The collective intent for us, at least at the tactical level, was to place in doubt the true nature of our strengths, hide any weaknesses or vulnerabilities, take advantage of ‘non-traditional’ effects on the battlefield and influence the outcome by placing doubt in the minds of our ‘enemy’ leadership.
[We] were permitted to target the leadership, running false news about this battalion commander or that brigade commander, even before the tactical play had begun. News travels fast in the Soldier network when we plant stories that their command graduated at the bottom of their particular class at West Point; that they wrote their CGSC or War College papers on “Why We Need Better Army Soldiers” (every Soldier just loves to hear that their leadership doesn’t believe in them); or that the leaders had some minor fracas with the law in their past. Some of these stories were true; others were not, but that was not the point. We were able to produce radio segments that overstated our current capabilities (seeding doubt) while undercutting, with a great degree of accuracy of information, the operational readiness of units preparing to ‘fight’ us in the upcoming mock battles (degrading trust). Many of the scenarios for our upcoming battles called for the employment of Civilians on the Battlefield (COBSs). COBs planted stories or influenced our enemies as they began to engage with them - we would make great use of these partisan forces, for eventually, NATO units would invariably do something to turn the sentiment against them and for us, the bad guys.
We would station forces in one place, then move them in the morning to another assembly area and then do it again, making it very difficult to pin down where our center of mass truly was. We would stage maneuvers that to the onlooker were confusing demonstrations of capability, but not signaling any direct intent. We would mass artillery fires into open fields for no reason, then quickly displace, well away from but within observation of BLUFOR (the U.S./NATO forces) to test their counter fire response times. We would establish fake tanks and IFVs in easily detectable locations: fakes designed to draw attention away, by diverting our opponent’s intelligence assets, from the position of our real forces.
To continue to deceive our foes of our true intent, we would establish fake command and control facilities, with multiple antennae emitting perpetual fake RF energy, deceiving the intelligence of our opponents looking to template where we would command and control the fight. We would both listen into and jam enemy communications with rudimentary electronic warfare capabilities, degrading their ability to even use a radio. We would ‘drop’ lost CDs and portable media in the hopes that our adversaries would pick them up, install them, and immediately infect their command and control systems with malicious code (this part was notional, of course) designed to shut down units’ abilities to fight. Or, we would just ‘drop’ fake concept graphics of our intent in public places know to be used by U.S. Soldiers in the hopes that some unsuspecting GI would find them and alert his chain of command.
During reconnaissance missions of BLUFOR defenses, we would place actual NATO mine warning signs in places where there were no minefields so that our enemies would wake up thinking that their defenses got better overnight, making them complacent because of course, no one checked. While establishing defenses, we likewise established fake minefields to deceive reconnaissance elements and then “move” the minefields, since the fakes were usually just wooden dowels sticking out of the ground made to look like a buried anti-tank mine was beneath the surface (much too easy to just put the dowels in the ground under limited visibility conditions without actually putting in the anti-tank mines; but hey, it looks the same).
Lastly, for every rotational scenario we worked hard to keep COBs on our side, ensuring a compliant population--or at least a fearful one—did not support NATO forces, regardless of how legitimate their mission.
These and other examples set conditions for our forces to rapidly defeat NATO elements almost every time, though most NATO/U.S. units had a decisive technological edge over our formations. [..] We were able to influence the outcome by either denying our adversary the clear intelligence they needed to win or to simply break down the command and control of organizations [..]. Maskirovka provided me options while simultaneously degrading options in my opponents simply because we jammed up their decision cycles with constant doubt. [..] It remains a large “hole in our swing”, that U.S. and NATO tactical and operational units have great difficulty covering.( ... tālāk ... )
"I like artificial intelligence because we're still so short of the real thing" - Charlie Munger
Paul Ryan's really obsessed with telling people to put the cap on their pen so their shirt doesn't get stained
"I think we are moving into a post-NATO environment, so we jolly well need to be able to survive without NATO. The security assumptions of the past 25 years have been fundamentally undermined by the combination of, first of all, low defence spending in Europe"
- FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring governments e.g. Latvia.
In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a senior government figure reported that there had been only limited success in penetrating the “first tier” foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks, and the IFIs. To compensate for this shortfall, massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking the “secondary targets”, particularly western private banks and the government of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned Latvia in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been unwittingly compromised, were recruited.
"EU [has] no authority to discuss matters of national security and intelligence."
"[S]ecurity analysts now view the Baltic Sea as a main theater in a new cyberwarfare arms race."
Kaapeec Turcijas apveersums neizdevaas, principaa. Teorija:
"Throughout the 1980s, Chaum was torn between fear and hope. The Berkeley graduate looked like a cliché: gray beard, full mane of hair tied to a ponytail, and Birkenstocks. Chaum was concerned that “automation of the way we pay for goods and services” was advancing in large strides. He shuddered at the prospect of somebody else connecting the dots of his life. Chaum knew that an irritatingly detailed picture could be pieced together from hotel bookings, transportation, restaurant visits, movie rentals, theater visits, lectures, dues, and purchases of food, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, books, news, religious and political material. “Computerization,” he lamented in 1985, “is robbing individuals of the ability to monitor and control the ways information about them is used.”
Individuals in both the private and public sectors would routinely exchange such personal information about consumers and citizens. The individual user, Chaum was concerned, would lose control and visibility; there was no way to tell whether the information collected in bulk was accurate, obsolete, or inappropriate. “The foundation is being laid for a dossier society, in which computers could be used to infer individuals’ life-styles, habits, whereabouts, and associations from data collected in ordinary consumer transactions.” Such an outcome, Chaum suspected, would be unacceptable to many.
Thankfully, public-key encryption had emerged just in time to save privacy from automation, computerization, and data-hungry corporations and governments. So Chaum started working on concrete solutions: untraceable electronic mail, digital pseudonyms, anonymous credentials, and general protection of privacy. Chaum is best known for yet another revolutionary cryptographic discovery: blind signatures.
[..] If crypto cash would not be adopted widely, Chaum feared, “invisible mass surveillance” would be inevitable, “perhaps irreversible.”"
@madars, wink wink
"Russia uses electronic warfare for four primary roles:
– Denying communications: There are regions in Donbass where no electromagnetic communications—including radio, cellphone and television—work.
– Defeating unmanned aerial systems: Electronic warfare is the single largest killer of Ukrainian systems by jamming either the controller or GPS signals.
– Defeating artillery and mortars: Russian electronic warfare pre-detonates or duds incoming artillery and mortar rounds that have electronic fusing.
– Targeting command and control nodes: Russian electronic warfare can detect all electromagnetic emissions, including those from radios, Blue Force Tracker, Wi-Fi and cellphones, which can then be pinpointed with unmanned aerial systems and targeted with massed artillery.
To compete in an electronic warfare environment, the Army must become proficient on analog systems again, remove all unnecessary electromagnetic emitters such as personal cellphones; route antennas as far from operations centers as possible; conduct “a day without radios or computers” during training missions; and quickly field its own organic electronic warfare systems.
[..] Ukrainian units have observed up to eight Russian UAV overflights per day, and the constant awareness of being observed and targeted is often a traumatic experience that instills fear and inhibits movement, particularly in daylight.
[..] Data from the Ukraine conflict show that artillery is producing approximately 80 percent of all casualties.
[..] Russia operates the world’s largest and densest mobile air defense network in the Donbass region. The combination of integrated and networked self-propelled air defense systems and manportable air defense systems virtually shot the Ukrainian air force out of its own sky.
Ukrainian helicopters were reduced to flying 3 to 5 meters above ground or treetop level to avoid the larger surface-to-air missiles from the self-propelled systems, but ambush teams of two to five manportable air defense systems, cued by the integrated air defense network, shot them down."
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