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None of the Above (

artis) rakstīja,
@ 2019-09-02 20:43:00

The Rise and Fall of the Liberal Order
https://youtu.be/7kRtt4Jrd_Y

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krishjaanis2
2019-09-03 00:05 (saite)

Ļoti labi.
Bet viņam nesenajā grāmatā (kas ir laba) daudzas dīvainas idejas, kas, kā viņš apgalvo, izriet no offensive realism pieejas, piemēram, ka ASV nevajadzēja sākt "ideoloģizētu" karu Vjetnamā (pilnīg aplami, ASV to karu vajadzēja uzvarēt) un caur pirkstiem var lasīt, ka NATO ekspansija R virzienā bija "pārsteidzīga". Viņa argumenti grāmatā ir dīvaini, vēl jo vairāk, ja ņem vērā, ka viņš piepeši pārslēdzas no offensive realism uz balance of power pieeju. Saskaņā ar ofensīvo reālismu, NATO ekspansija bija loģisks un likumsakarīgs solis, bet nē, redz, viņam tas iztraucējis balance of power.

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	artis 2019-09-03 10:29 (saite)
	> caur pirkstiem var lasīt, ka NATO ekspansija R virzienā bija "pārsteidzīga". Nē, to viņš saka bez aplinkiem. Tāpat viņš piekrīt, ka tas bija loģisks solis, bet viņš apgalvo, ka R pienācīgi nenovērtēja Krievijas atbildi. (Atbildēt uz šo) (Iepriekšējais)

	artis 2019-09-03 11:01 (saite)
	Ja esam godīgi pret sevi, jāatzīst, ka mūsu uzņemšana NATO sakrita ar liberālās kārtības (vai romantisma, sauc to kā gribi) nevis reālisma pieejas zenītu. Mēs paspējām un iemukām. Tā ir liela laime, ka pratām izmantot izdevību. No dispassionate perspektīvas, uzņemt mūs šodien būtu ... more trouble than it's worth. (Atbildēt uz šo) (Iepriekšējais) (Diskusija)

krishjaanis2
2019-09-03 23:19 (saite)

Jā, piekrītu, bet es tieši par to, ka Mīrshaimers nav konsekvents, jo kāpēc lai NATO ekspansijas nebūtu vienkārši tipisks ofensīvā reālisma gadījums, ASV mēģinot kastrēt un pazemot un, iespējams, pēc iespējas vairāk neitralizēt savu galveno konkurentu reģionā? Jā, valstis šādi pārrēķinās, un tas ir viens no ofensīvā reālisma punktiem, es tikai nesaprotu, kāpēc viņam piepeši ieslēdzas balance of power pieeja, proti, kāpēc lai ASV stratēgiskajās interesēs (ne obligāti sekojot liberālisma kā dogmas izplatīšanai) nebūtu Ukrainas, Gruzijas, Baltijas utt kā kordona pievākšana?

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	krishjaanis2 2019-09-03 23:22 (saite)
	Neatkarīgi vai par spīti liberal world order, Zeihans un Dž.Frīdmens arī saka, ka ASV to visu dara, t.sk. bijušo A-bloku, jo gluži vienkārši var atļauties. Nevis, ka “pārrēķinās” vai “nevajadzīgi kaitina Krieviju”. (Atbildēt uz šo) (Iepriekšējais)

artis
2019-09-04 14:37 (saite)

Piekrītu, ka tur sanāk zināma nekonsekvence ar ofensīvo reālismu. Turklāt, Mīrshaimeram ir arī šāda publikācija:

https://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Ukraine%20Article%20in%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf

Cik noprotu, viņš grib ieturēt pragmatismu attiecībās ar Krieviju, jo uzskata, ka atgrūžot Krieviju, Krievija pievērsīsies Ķīnai, kas ASV galīgi nav izdevīgi. Kā Sino-Soviet split laikos, tikai tagad lomas ASV cer mainīt. ASV saprot, ka viņu peer-competitor ir Ķīna. Krievija spēlē tikai sekundāru lomu. Tas pats ar Austrāliju u.c.

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artis
2019-09-04 15:13 (saite)

Piekrītu tam, ko iezīmēju treknrakstā! To pierāda arī fakts, ka NATO pat nebija plāna kā aizsargāt Baltijas valstis vēl ilgi pēc to uzņemšanas aliancē. "Operation Eagle Guardian" izstrādāja tikai 2010.g., bet praktiskus soļus (piemēram, Enhanced Forward Presence) sāka veikt tikai pēc 2016.g. Varšavas samita.

Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy
because they thought Russia still needed to be contained.

But most realists opposed expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe. [..]

In essence, the two sides have been operating with different playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. [..]

History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule. [..]

The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral bu*er between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp. [..]

Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even if Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height of folly to create a new NATO member that the other members have no intention of defending. NATO has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine NATO membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course. [..]

The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together.

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artis
2019-09-05 15:15 (saite)

"CL: Kennedy was trying to dissuade de Gaulle to develop a nuclear arsenal. Kennedy said: ”Why do you need this?” De Gaulle replied: ”Because you Americans won’t trade New York or Chicago to protect Hamburg and Paris.” It gets increasingly difficult for our allies to be reassured and for our adversaries to believe that we would really do what we say we’ll do! And you see that in Europe today. I understand that the Baltic states are nervous about their security after what happened in Crimea. I would make an argument here that is not going to be popular, but I never searched for popularity. Expanding NATO was a huge strategic mistake for a number of reasons, least of which was to put the US in the position to guarantee the security of certain countries that are not really important to the US. [..]

The Versailles Treaty humiliated the Germans and left them longing for revenge. I think there was little concern about avoiding the possibility of a Weimar Russia . After Sweden collapsed, not just Ukraine but also the Baltic states were part of the Russian Empire. These assurances were given to the Soviets, to Gorbachev, during the negotiations over Germany`s reunification ... but: „Why do we need to remember when Russia was so weak?...after the Soviet Union collapsed?”. But, we have a saying in America: „What goes around, comes around”. And, everybody is talking about the pivot to Asia. Well, maybe, we should talk about Putin`s pivot to China ... we basically pushed Russia out into China`s arms and this is not a very smart thing if you think that China is your emerging competitor geopolitically.

GMT: I find it very interesting that a Realist like you -- to come back to the subject of NATO expansion -- tells me that Russia was weak, that the US was powerful and that`s why the US pushed into Eastern Europe. You claim that the whole NATO expansion was a mistake. But from a Realist perspective, the powerful does as it pleases and the weak does whatever it can. So why was NATO’s enlargement a mistake? The US pushed because Russia was weak. This matches the idea of great power behavior, although from an Offensive Realist perspective."

CL: The US does not like spheres of influence. Others actually do. But, I think it was Cordell Hull in 1944 who said that: „America rejects spheres of influence, rejects the balance of power”. Why is that? Because we have a universalist notion of our power: the whole world is our sphere of influence. [..] And, we may not like the idea of spheres of influence, but the Russians do regard certain parts of Europe as regions where, historically, they had an interest, way before the Communists came to power in 1917. And I think, by not respecting the status of Russia as a great power, or as a major regional power, we are alienating Moscow. [A]merica’s strategy should be exactly what we did in Libya -- to force others to take more responsibility for their own security. [..] In late 1940s - early 1950s we wanted Europe to be economically integrated, we wanted to be strong militarily, but not so strong as to challenge the United States. [..] We complain about the burden-sharing. „Europe doesn’t do enough; Europe doesn’t do enough!” Then, we saw several instances in history where Europeans tried to do more,and Washington replied with: „What are you doing, you are going to destroy NATO!” So, there always was some sort of ambivalence. [..] Thomas de Maizière, who was then the defence minister [..] said, very candidly: „I can’t get any enthusiasm among the people in the Bundestag or among the German public to spend more money on defence.” [..] How much do the Baltic states spend on defence in terms of their quota of GDP? Very low. And they are complaining that they are not protected. „If Europe doesn’t want to spend more money to defend itself, why should we?” There is a lot of frustration in Washington with the Europeans.

GMT: [..] Europe is pacified, and, Europe does not have the military capabilities to challenge anybody. Therefore there is a dismissive attitude towards the Europeans in certain Washington circles."

http://www.politicalaest.ro/publicatii/2014/11/interviu-christopher-layne-si-gabriela-marinthornton

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krishjaanis2
2019-09-08 10:14 (saite)

Tikai tad no viņa reālisma prizmas sanāk nonākt pie tik absurdiem secinājumiem,ka GER,IT,FRA utt ir daudz tālredzīgākas, gudrākas atttieksmē pret RU nekā US un GB kopā, un ka RU “stratēģiskās intereses” teju pusē kontinentālās Eiropas ir jārespektē, tās ir leģitīmas, jo RU ir lielvara, vēsturisks reģiona varturis. Dīvains, ar ofensiiiīvo reālismu nesaskanīgs viedoklis viņam ir arī par Izraēlu.

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	artis 2019-09-03 11:12 (saite)
	https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-14/nato-expansion-if-it-was-a-mistake-why-hasn-t-putin-invaded (Atbildēt uz šo) (Iepriekšējais)

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