HOW TO DEFEND THE BALTIC STATES By R. D. Hooker, J (2019)
[T]he Balts themselves must first step up. Although
small in population and GDP, they are capable of much more than they are doing now. With a combined
population of some 6 million, only 22,000 citizens are under arms. Most are contract soldiers who serve short
tours of duty, although Lithuania has recently reintroduced nine-month limited conscription. 53 Thirty
thousand indifferently trained and equipped reservists are also on the books. In comparison, with a similarsized population,
Finland fielded some 300,000 troops in the 1939 Winter War. Tiny Latvia fielded a 70,000-
man army during its War of Independence in 1919. The Estonian army at the same time fielded 80,000. Today,
Israel, a state with an equivalent population, fields an active army of 176,000 with another 465,000 upon full
mobilization.

Like West Germany during the Cold War, the Baltic States should organize their national territories for defense.
This means pre-chambering key bridges for demolition, stockpiling munitions and developing plans to emplace
minefields in key locations in accordance with a national obstacle plan, hardening command posts and logistics
storage areas, constructing field fortifications and preparing anti-tank obstacles along avenues of approach.62
Civil defense preparations, such as stockpiling food and medical supplies, potable water, oil and natural gas,
will be needed (the Baltic States are heavily dependent on Russian energy imports). Such measures need not
unduly disrupt civilian life, but they will go far to enhance deterrence and defense.

All three of the Baltic States are signatories to the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines, a serious
liability here. Russia, of course, did not sign the Treaty.

One option that merits serious consideration is the recent Polish offer to finance and base a US heavy division
in Poland.75 To keep costs down and avoid congressional opposition, this force should rotate every nine months
and fall in on prepositioned equipment already present in the theater.76 (The garrison and families would
remain in the continental US.) The MLRS-equipped corps field artillery brigade (the 41st FA brigade now based
in Germany) should be repositioned to Poland. A division-sized presence in Poland will enhance the US’ ability
to exercise regularly in the Baltic States; dramatically reduce response times; materially alter the balance of
forces; and improve both deterrence and defense. At the same time, a single US division cannot pose an
offensive threat.

Poland is a bright spot in an otherwise depressing picture. With four heavy divisions plus a parachute brigade
(and with Patriot and MLRS acquisitions underway), Poland can mount a stout defense of its national territory,
though its ability to offer troops for the defense of the Baltic States is less clear.79 Still, defending the Suwałki
Gap, securing Polish territory for staging and onward movement, and holding Kaliningrad at risk are major
contributions. It is also likely that Russian planners will withhold strong ground units (probably the 20th CAA)
for potential use against the Poles, lessening the pool of combat units that can be used against the Balts. The
bulk of Polish ground forces will remain on or near Polish territory for this reason.

As multiple authoritative studies have concluded, NATO today cannot defend the Baltic States. The
implications are clear: failure to defend in place for the first 30 days means a quick collapse before
NATO can realistically intervene, the occupation of the Baltic States, and the probable splintering of
the Alliance. Even if the initial defense is successful with the enhancements discussed herein, failure to rapidly
reinforce means the eventual collapse of the defense and the likely reincorporation of the Baltic States into the
Russian Federation. Taking back the Baltics as opposed to defending them reverses the odds, from 1:3 for
defense to 3:1 for offensive operations—a daunting prospect requiring nine times as many forces.

For all these reasons, it is imperative that 1) NATO forces overcome the Kaliningrad air-defense bastion within
14 days to bring the Alliance’s airpower advantages into play 2); in-place forces and rapidly arriving
reinforcements hold out for 30 days; and 3) heavy reinforcements arrive in strength and enter the fight not later
than 30 days after commencement of hostilities. Today, NATO is not prepared to accomplish any of these
objectives. As long as this is so, a window of vulnerability exists that Putin can exploit.

Much remains to be done. A leisurely or complacent approach could be fatal.

Key indicators will include movement forward of field hospitals, bulk fuel and ammunition;
marshalling of transport aircraft and rail cars; unit recalls; social media activity; deployment of large forces
towards the border and into Belarus; and intensified information operations and border provocations, among
others.

The Russian intention is twofold: if possible, to strike
through Lithuania to link up with Kaliningrad, cutting off the Baltic States altogether; if not, to seize and hold
Estonia and possibly Latvia to demonstrate NATO’s inability to enforce Article 5 and fracture the Alliance. The
pretext would likely be claims that Russian ethnic minorities have been attacked or oppressed. NATO would
see these preparations, and much would depend on an early decision to posture for defense. Russian
disinformation would be intense and many allies would be hesitant to react. If the North Atlantic Council delays
until after Russian forces have crossed the border, the lost time could be fatal. In this contingency, the US should
immediately form a coalition based on its strongest and closest allies.

If all goes well, the Baltic States will be arrayed for defense with seven active brigades and three eFP battalions,
augmented by one US heavy brigade in Lithuania and US airborne brigades in Latvia and Estonia, before
Russian forces reach NATO territory. Reserve units will secure critical infrastructure and provide local defense.

On D-Day, the most likely Russian course of action will be an attack by the 1st GTA, with one tank division
(with two brigades) and two airborne regiments, from Belarus on the axis Minsk–Vilnius–Kaunas–Kaliningrad.

A supporting attack,
conducted with one motor rifle division (with two brigades) and one airborne regiment, will attempt to seize
Riga along the axis Daugavpils–Jekabpils–Riga. This operation will feature parachute and heliborne operations
in rear areas to seize key crossings over the Daugava River.

These operations will follow major road and rail networks and will ignore national boundaries. As a theater
reserve, the Western Military District will retain control of one air assault division, one Spetsnaz brigade, and
one heavy artillery brigade. Spetsnaz units will not be used as maneuver units but will instead carry out attacks
against critical nodes and infrastructure. They will be used boldly and aggressively deep inside Baltic territory
and deserve serious consideration from commanders and planners.

In the attack, Russian commanders will advance aggressively under heavy artillery, supported by attack
helicopters, fixed wing close air support, cyberattacks and electronic warfare. Small tactical drones will be used
in “swarms” to spot artillery targets. While force ratios in terms of maneuver units are not overwhelming,
Russian superiority in armor, artillery fires, electronic warfare and close air support will be strong. Combat
experience will also provide an edge. They will show little regard for civilian casualties and will be prepared to
sustain losses themselves. All Russian unit leaders will understand the importance of winning quickly, as every
delay will give NATO more time to react.

As long as Gotland is not used by NATO troops or aircraft, Putin and his advisors
may choose to exercise restraint here. Should Sweden cede use of its airspace to NATO, the Russian position
would likely change.89 From the allied perspective, use of Swedish airspace, airfields and territorial waters would
greatly enhance air and maritime operations, complicate Russian planning and materially alter the balance of
forces. 90 Accordingly, NATO should encourage Sweden and Finland to join the Alliance as full-fledged
members in the event of Russian aggression. While not likely to send ground forces to the Baltic States, both
nations can play key roles in resisting Russian aggression with their air and naval forces.

Located close to the border with Belarus, Vilnius is the
capital of the strongest Baltic state and a successful defense will go far to stall the Russian offensive, encourage
allied forces and capitals, and frustrate Russian information objectives. Here, the early arrival of a US heavy
brigade from Poland will be critical, ideally with supporting attack helicopters and MLRS systems.

Local topography, with many streams, river lines, swamps and forests, as well as
urban terrain in the capital itself, favors the defense. Russian tank strength will outnumber the defenders, but
anti-tank systems like the Javelin and the AH-64E Apache attack helicopter will help to even the odds. 93
Lithuanian troops will be fighting to defend their national existence. Although close to the border, Vilnius must
be held as long as possible to preserve the integrity of the defense. The prospects for success here are fair.

[Königsberg] will be perhaps the key decision of the conflict. Russian propaganda will trumpet the “sacred soil of the
motherland,” and Russian leaders will threaten nuclear retaliation, while many allied leaders may blanch at
attacking Russian territory. Here, strong nerves will be needed. Despite the angry messaging, Russian leaders
will remember that they began the conflict, counting on NATO weakness and indecision, and they will not be
willing to risk nuclear escalation and devastation over an isolated, small territory with no history of Russian
occupation except in the post-war period. They cannot expect NATO to treat Kaliningrad with kid gloves.

The possibility of Russian use of nuclear fires here suggests a need for a clearer and more pronounced NATO
nuclear policy, stating clearly that any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an immediate and proportional
response. While Putin may not fear a NATO first strike in response to limited conventional aggression in the
Baltic States, he must understand that he cannot achieve his objectives merely by threatening to use his nuclear
weapons. He will not, in any case, take this decision lightly. But a firm declaration of NATO’s intent can greatly
increase deterrence and reduce the chances of escalation.

With no real operational reserves, Latvian forces will probably delay and fall
back on the capital, while special operations and territorial units attempt to harass Russian logistics units. A
stout delaying action in and around Daugavpils, with its important river crossing and highway intersections,
will be crucial. This notional campaign plan calls for the deployment of a US airborne brigade from the 82nd
Airborne Division to Riga prior to D-Day. With these forces, and despite Russian advantages in fires and
airpower, the prospects for holding onto Riga and its approaches until help arrives are good.

In this way, Baltic units can be “stiffened” by US Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements, with enhanced
situational awareness and performance. US Special Forces operating with reserve Baltic units in rear areas and
along Russian supply lines can also inflict serious damage and slow Russian progress.

In the scenario presented in this study, given the
lack of depth in the battlespace and Russia’s initial dominance in fires and air defense, NATO’s initial inferiority
on land requires the closest possible coordination between air and ground. Anything less may cause campaign
failure.

At this point, Russia will likely engage in anxious diplomacy to freeze the conflict in place in order to hold on
to at least some Baltic territory. This would at least achieve a minimalist objective of undercutting NATO’s
Article 5 guarantee. NATO leaders should ignore these overtures and continue the campaign until Russian
forces have been evicted from NATO territory. Ceasefire offers “to facilitate negotiations” should be ignored as
delaying tactics to allow Russia to generate more forces. Escalation in Ukraine’s Donbas can also be expected.

As NATO moves toward military success, the end game will transition more and more into the realm of
diplomacy. Leaders in capitals may want to entertain some Russian proposals, such as sanctions relief, the
return of a demilitarized Kaliningrad, the possible incorporation of Belarus into the Russian Federation or
concessions to ethnic-Russian minorities, as face-saving measures to facilitate conflict termination. The merits
of these are outside the scope of this paper, but concessions that maintain core interests—the preservation of
Baltic national territory and sovereignty and, by extension, NATO’s credibility and cohesion—should be
carefully and thoughtfully considered.

To date, the US has done little to “strengthen deterrence and defense on NATO’s eastern flank” or to “catalyze
frontline allies’ ability to better defend themselves,” as called for in the 2017 National Security Strategy.111 In
2018, three times as much financial assistance went to Rwanda as to any of the Baltic States. Virtually none of
the $15 billion appropriated to date for the European Deterrence Initiative has found its way to them. Yet, the
defense of NATO’s eastern flank may be one of the most pressing national security issues of our time.
Repeatedly, Russia has used force against its neighbors to regain control of its “near abroad.” Taking on NATO
is clearly a big step. But if NATO is seen to lack cohesion, credibility and capability—and there are clear grounds
to question all three—then the threat to the Baltics and therefore to NATO must be considered high.

The costs
are not prohibitive, especially considering NATO’s great wealth. The alternative is ominous to contemplate.

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