None of the Above ([info]artis) rakstīja,
@ 2016-10-14 14:22:00

Previous Entry  Add to memories!  Tell a Friend!  Next Entry
THE MYTH OF THE RULE OF LAW
"The truth is, of course, that both are engaging in politics. Because the law is made up of contradictory rules that can generate any conclusion, what conclusion one finds will be determined by what conclusion one looks for, i.e., by the hypothesis one decides to test. This will invariably be the one that intuitively "feels" right, the one that is most congruent with one's antecedent, underlying political and moral beliefs. Thus, legal conclusions are always determined by the normative assumptions of the decisionmaker. The knowledge that Kingsfield possesses and Arnie and Ann have not yet discovered is that the law is never neutral and objective. [..]

To have been appointed to the bench, it is virtually certain that they were both politically moderate and well-connected, and, until recently, white males of the correct ethnic and religious pedigree. It should be clear that, culturally speaking, such a group will tend to be quite homogeneous, sharing a great many moral, spiritual, and political beliefs and values. Given this, it can hardly be surprising that there will be a high degree of agreement among judges as to how cases ought to be decided. But this agreement is due to the common set of normative presuppositions the judges share, not some immanent, objective meaning that exists within the rules of law. [..]

The law appears to be stable because of the slowness with which it evolves. But the slow pace of legal development is not due to any inherent characteristic of the law itself. Logically speaking, any conclusion, however radical, is derivable from the rules of law. It is simply that, even between generations, the range of ideological opinion represented on the bench is so narrow that anything more than incremental departures from conventional wisdom and morality will not be respected within the profession. Such decisions are virtually certain to be overturned on appeal, and thus, are rarely even rendered in the first instance.

This suggests that as the ideological solidarity of the judiciary breaks down, so too does the predictability of legal decisionmaking, and hence, the stability of the law. Regardless of this trend, I hope it is now apparent that to assume that the law is stable because it is determinate is to reverse cause and effect. Rather, it is because the law is basically stable that it appears to be determinate. It is not rule of law that gives us a stable legal system; it is the stability of the culturally shared values of the judiciary that gives rise to and supports the myth of the rule of law.

The purpose of a myth is not to persuade one's reason, but to enlist one's emotions in support of an idea. And this is precisely the case for the myth of the rule of law; its purpose is to enlist the emotions of the public in support of society's political power structure.

People are more willing to support the exercise of authority over themselves when they believe it to be an objective, neutral feature of the natural world. This was the idea behind the concept of the divine right of kings. By making the king appear to be an integral part of God's plan for the world rather than an ordinary human being dominating his fellows by brute force, the public could be more easily persuaded to bow to his authority. However, when the doctrine of divine right became discredited, a replacement was needed to ensure that the public did not view political authority as merely the exercise of naked power. That replacement is the concept of the rule of law.


But the myth of the rule of law does more than render the people submissive to state authority; it also turns them into the state's accomplices in the exercise of its power. For people who would ordinarily consider it a great evil to deprive individuals of their rights or oppress politically powerless minority groups will respond with patriotic fervor when these same actions are described as upholding the rule of law.

Consider the situation in India toward the end of British colonial rule. At that time, the followers of Mohandas Gandhi engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience by manufacturing salt for their own use in contravention of the British monopoly on such manufacture. The British administration and army responded with mass imprisonments and shocking brutality. It is difficult to understand this behavior on the part of the highly moralistic, ever-so-civilized British unless one keeps in mind that they were able to view their activities not as violently repressing the indigenous population, but as upholding the rule of law.

The reason why the myth of the rule of law has survived for 100 years despite the knowledge of its falsity is that it is too valuable a tool to relinquish. The myth of impersonal government is simply the most effective means of social control available to the state.

The primary reason for this is that the public has been politically indoctrinated to fail to recognize the distinction between order and law. The state nurtures this confusion because it is the public's inability to distinguish order from law that generates its fundamental support for the state. As long as the public identifies order with law, it will believe that an orderly society is impossible without the law the state provides. And as long as the public believes this, it will continue to support the state almost without regard to how oppressive it may become.

But because the public has been conditioned to express its desire for order as one for law, all calls for a more orderly society are interpreted as calls for more law. And since under our current political system, all law is supplied by the state, all such calls are interpreted as calls for a more active and powerful state.

The law is an amalgam of contradictory rules and counter-rules expressed in inherently vague language that can yield a legitimate legal argument for any desired conclusion. For this reason, as long as the law remains a state monopoly, it will always reflect the political ideology of those invested with decision-making power. Like it or not, we are faced with only two choices. We can continue the ideological power struggle for control of the law in which the group that gains dominance is empowered to impose its will on the rest of society, or we can end the monopoly."


http://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/GTWebSite/MythWeb.htm


(Ierakstīt jaunu komentāru)


[info]krishjaanis
2016-10-14 18:09 (saite)
Ne tikai rule of law. Nation state un nacionālā ideoloģija jeb mīkstinātāk - nacionālā ideja (piem, LV arī ir i d e j a) arī kalpo/-tu par tādu leģitimējoši virzošu autorizējoši funkcionālu spēku in the absence of gods and kings. Kas nav nekas jauns - nacionālā valsts pat ar visu demokrātisko iekārtu ir sort of tribal mentality ekstrapolācija ar modernu līdzekļu palīdzību. Iedod zemgaļiem vai kuršiem līdzīgas sviras, būtu nation state. Viņiem tikai nebija valsts sponsorētas skolas un masu mediji. Bet autoritāte bija.

Skrūtons tieši tāpēc saka, ka rule of law ir iespējams tikai tad, ja kolektīvs vienums iegūst vai nostiprina first person plural sajūtu. Hence nation state un nacionālā mīta būtiskā nozīme demokrātiskas iekārtas funkcionēšanā.

(Atbildēt uz šo) (Diskusija)


[info]artis
2016-10-14 19:01 (saite)
Mīts neatrisina Trasimaha problēmu (“Listen—I say that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger."). Raksta piedāvātais risinājums ir back to viduslaiki, kur bija izvēle (shopping around):

"A free market in law would resemble the situation in Medieval Europe before the rise of strong central governments in which disputants could select among several fora. Depending upon the nature of the dispute, its geographical location, the parties' status, and what was convenient, the parties could bring their case in either village, shire, urban, merchant, manorial, ecclesiastical, or royal courts."

(Atbildēt uz šo) (Iepriekšējais) (Diskusija)


[info]artis
2016-10-14 19:09 (saite)
Trasimaha problēma, protams, nav problēma. Kļūsti par tiem "stiprākajiem".

(Atbildēt uz šo) (Iepriekšējais)


[info]krishjaanis
2016-10-14 23:29 (saite)
Jā, arī likums vikingu laika Islandē https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Icelandic_Commonwealth#Court_system
Tikai tur vēl "autorizējošāk" nekā viduslaiku Eiropā, jo nebija tādas lietas kā nodalīta "executive power", lieta tika izlemta, bet likumu īstenoja paši ieinteresētie cilvēki, piemēram, nomedījot ārpus likuma izsludināto vai sadalot piekrastē izskalotos spolus utml.

(Atbildēt uz šo) (Iepriekšējais)


Neesi iežurnalējies. Iežurnalēties?