None of the Above (![[info]](http://klab.lv/img/userinfo.gif){kind=small} artis) rakstīja,@ 2020-01-22 19:10:00 |
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When Russia Goes to War: Motives, Means and Indicators
This analysis will consider these questions as they relate to Russia’s immediate neighborhood, also known as the ‘near abroad’, and in particular to the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian interests in the near abroad are clearly visible; here Moscow has already twice deployed troops to pursue these interests in clear contravention of international law.
More recently,Russia’s military doctrine has clearly stated that Moscow reserves the right to use its armed forces to “protect the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens,” as well as,“to protect citizens of the Russian Federation abroad from armed attack on them. This narrative has been advanced in particular since 2008 and will likely continue to be used by Russia to justify its military operations abroad. Interestingly, TASS used a similar argument in September 1939 to explain and justify the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. The TASS release was explicit in saying that the Soviet troop deployments were intended to protect Belarusians and Ukrainians from the “horrors of war.” In 1939, it had long been recognized that the Soviet Union was trying to export communist values to the rest of Europe and then the world.
There is no communism today and Russia has lost its military and political influence in almost all of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Yet it still claims ‘privileged status’ in the post-Soviet space and will continue to leverage its position in the near abroad through economic, political, and military means, including armed invasion.
Russian belligerence is thus not driven by a desire to become an empire once again, but by an attempt to rebuild fragments of the imperial privileges that the Soviet Union once possessed—to reclaim the status, and influence that would allow Russia to again play a dominant role in the region and beyond.
Asharp deterioration of relations within the Euro-Atlantic community, one which would seriously call into question the NATO’s collective defence mechanism,is one of only a few scenarios that could plausibly encourage Russia to contemplate military options against the three states. On the other hand, the large Russian diaspora living in these countries makes them targets for Russian propaganda, especially amongst those citizens who may be sympathetic to the Russian cause and tempted by the Russian view of the world. Russia will thus attempt to use active measures to infiltrate and influence decision-making processes in the Baltic states.
Russia’s goals in the opening stages of a conflict would be the total destruction of the opposing forces and their combat potential. Any Allied forces in north-east Poland would also need to be engaged and destroyed to prevent timely reinforcement of the Baltic states. Russian forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast would play a supplementary role in this mission. The oblast is a valuable asset from which Russia can project power indifferent domains across the theatre, but it is also a vulnerability. There is not enough space to conduct effective defensive operations here, or to avoid artillery fires from both Poland and Lithuania. Russian forces would thus need to expand their depth by leaving the oblast and possibly moving into Poland.
The most recent iterations of Russia’s Zapad and Tsentr strategic exercises provided evidence that its basic warfighting strategy continues to rely on the principle of mass—the concentration of combat power at a particular time and place to ensure a rapid breakthrough of the defence’s tactical positions.
Once the defensive line hadbeen ruptured, the second-echelon forces would move to exploit success and pursue any remaining defence forces. These follow-on units wouldinclude large tank formations belonging to the 1stGTA, which would be responsible for capturing and holding territory until the third echelon arrived. The third-echelon role could be filled by troops of the Rosgvardia, which is tasked with counter-sabotage, both in Russia proper and abroad, and able to assume occupation duties in captured areas.
As of 2019, the capabilities of the Russian forces belonging to the 1stGTA,and6thand 20thCAAs are sufficient to allow them to seize the Baltic states, in particular as Russia would likely enjoy air superiority in the theatre in the early stages of any conflict.
Warning is a key issue: the more time Russia has to mobilise reserve personnel, the more robust its wartime posture will be. Within 5-7 days of a mobilisation announcement, each motor rifle brigade or regiment could deploy not three, but four combat-ready battalions.
Russia’s chances of seizing the Baltic states could be significantly raised by using Belarus (and preferably also its armed forces)as a springboard for operations into Kaliningrad and northern Poland.
Belarus could also serve as a key logistics hub for Russia. The inclusion of Belarus in the conflict would expand the manoeuvre and battlefield space,adding new axes of advance and allowing Russia to augment its forces with new (Belarusian) personnel. This, in turn, could spread NATO’s forces thinly along the frontline, at least during initial hostilities, and necessitate the deployment of a greater number of troops for counteroffensive operations.
In the Baltic region, the type of forces deployed for an operation against NATO would depend on how much time Moscow has to prepare its units. There is an understanding within the military establishment that warning time would be minimal, especially compared to the Cold War years when the Soviet Union’s force posture relied to a large extent relied on skeleton-strength units, which needed weeks and months to be declared combat ready.
https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2
This analysis will consider these questions as they relate to Russia’s immediate neighborhood, also known as the ‘near abroad’, and in particular to the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian interests in the near abroad are clearly visible; here Moscow has already twice deployed troops to pursue these interests in clear contravention of international law.
More recently,Russia’s military doctrine has clearly stated that Moscow reserves the right to use its armed forces to “protect the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens,” as well as,“to protect citizens of the Russian Federation abroad from armed attack on them. This narrative has been advanced in particular since 2008 and will likely continue to be used by Russia to justify its military operations abroad. Interestingly, TASS used a similar argument in September 1939 to explain and justify the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. The TASS release was explicit in saying that the Soviet troop deployments were intended to protect Belarusians and Ukrainians from the “horrors of war.” In 1939, it had long been recognized that the Soviet Union was trying to export communist values to the rest of Europe and then the world.
There is no communism today and Russia has lost its military and political influence in almost all of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Yet it still claims ‘privileged status’ in the post-Soviet space and will continue to leverage its position in the near abroad through economic, political, and military means, including armed invasion.
Russian belligerence is thus not driven by a desire to become an empire once again, but by an attempt to rebuild fragments of the imperial privileges that the Soviet Union once possessed—to reclaim the status, and influence that would allow Russia to again play a dominant role in the region and beyond.
Asharp deterioration of relations within the Euro-Atlantic community, one which would seriously call into question the NATO’s collective defence mechanism,is one of only a few scenarios that could plausibly encourage Russia to contemplate military options against the three states. On the other hand, the large Russian diaspora living in these countries makes them targets for Russian propaganda, especially amongst those citizens who may be sympathetic to the Russian cause and tempted by the Russian view of the world. Russia will thus attempt to use active measures to infiltrate and influence decision-making processes in the Baltic states.
Russia’s goals in the opening stages of a conflict would be the total destruction of the opposing forces and their combat potential. Any Allied forces in north-east Poland would also need to be engaged and destroyed to prevent timely reinforcement of the Baltic states. Russian forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast would play a supplementary role in this mission. The oblast is a valuable asset from which Russia can project power indifferent domains across the theatre, but it is also a vulnerability. There is not enough space to conduct effective defensive operations here, or to avoid artillery fires from both Poland and Lithuania. Russian forces would thus need to expand their depth by leaving the oblast and possibly moving into Poland.
The most recent iterations of Russia’s Zapad and Tsentr strategic exercises provided evidence that its basic warfighting strategy continues to rely on the principle of mass—the concentration of combat power at a particular time and place to ensure a rapid breakthrough of the defence’s tactical positions.
Once the defensive line hadbeen ruptured, the second-echelon forces would move to exploit success and pursue any remaining defence forces. These follow-on units wouldinclude large tank formations belonging to the 1stGTA, which would be responsible for capturing and holding territory until the third echelon arrived. The third-echelon role could be filled by troops of the Rosgvardia, which is tasked with counter-sabotage, both in Russia proper and abroad, and able to assume occupation duties in captured areas.
As of 2019, the capabilities of the Russian forces belonging to the 1stGTA,and6thand 20thCAAs are sufficient to allow them to seize the Baltic states, in particular as Russia would likely enjoy air superiority in the theatre in the early stages of any conflict.
Warning is a key issue: the more time Russia has to mobilise reserve personnel, the more robust its wartime posture will be. Within 5-7 days of a mobilisation announcement, each motor rifle brigade or regiment could deploy not three, but four combat-ready battalions.
Russia’s chances of seizing the Baltic states could be significantly raised by using Belarus (and preferably also its armed forces)as a springboard for operations into Kaliningrad and northern Poland.
Belarus could also serve as a key logistics hub for Russia. The inclusion of Belarus in the conflict would expand the manoeuvre and battlefield space,adding new axes of advance and allowing Russia to augment its forces with new (Belarusian) personnel. This, in turn, could spread NATO’s forces thinly along the frontline, at least during initial hostilities, and necessitate the deployment of a greater number of troops for counteroffensive operations.
In the Baltic region, the type of forces deployed for an operation against NATO would depend on how much time Moscow has to prepare its units. There is an understanding within the military establishment that warning time would be minimal, especially compared to the Cold War years when the Soviet Union’s force posture relied to a large extent relied on skeleton-strength units, which needed weeks and months to be declared combat ready.
https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2
