Until it's proven otherwise, why not assume that consciousness does not play a significant role in human behavior? Although the idea may seem radical at first, it is actually the conservative position, the one that makes the fewest assumptions. The null position is the antidote to philosopher's disease—the inappropriate attribution of rational, conscious control over processes that may be irrational and unconscious. The argument is not that we lack consciousness but that we overestimate the conscious control of behavior.

I believe this statement to be true, but proving it is a challenge, because it's difficult to think about consciousness. We are misled by an inner voice that generates a reasonable but often fallacious narrative and explanation of our actions. That the beam of conscious awareness illuminating our actions is on only part of the time further complicates the task. Since we are not conscious of our state of unconsciousness, we vastly overestimate the amount of time that we are aware of our actions, whatever their cause.

When people were asked to explain why they laughed in a particular situation, they would concoct some reasonable fiction about the cause of their behavior ("She did something funny," "It was something she said," "I wanted to put her at ease"). Observations of social context showed that such explanations were usually wrong. In clinical settings, such post–hoc misattributions would be termed "confabulations"—honest but flawed attempts to explain one's actions.

Subjects also incorrectly presumed that laughing is a choice and under conscious control—a reason for their confident, if bogus, explanations of their behavior. But laughing is not a matter of uttering "Ha–Ha," as we would choose a word in speech. When challenged to laugh on command, most subjects could not do so. In certain, usually playful social contexts, laughter simply happens. However, this lack of voluntary control does not preclude an orderly, predictable pattern of behavior. Laughter appears at those places where punctuation would appear in the structure of speech. We may say, "I have to go now—ha–ha" but rarely "I have to—ha–ha—go now." This punctuation effect is highly reliable and requires the coordination of laughing with the linguistic structure of speech, yet it is performed without the conscious awareness of the speaker.

Can the question of animal consciousness be stood on its head and treated in a more parsimonious manner? Instead of wondering whether other animals are conscious, or have a different, or lesser consciousness than ours, should we be wondering whether our behavior is under no more conscious control than theirs? The complex socila order of bees, ants, and termites documents what can be achieved with little if any conscious control, as we thin of it.

— Robert R. Provine