03 February 2013 @ 11:39 pm
language and thought  
"I went to the door to walk out and was actually turning the handle to leave, when I see this man who looked so frightened. He was holding himself as if he were wearing a straightjacket. He was backed up in a corner, protecting himself. I saw that he was studying mouths, he was studying people. Even though he was frightened, he was still watching: what is happening, what is happening?"

She observed as another aide, one who couldn’t sign very well, tried to reach the frightened man. When the other assistant gave up, Schaller tried to engage the man and his true situation started to dawn on her:

"I walked up to him and signed, “Hello. My name is Susan.” He tried to copy that and did a sloppy rendition of “Hello, my name is Susan.” Obviously he didn’t know what he was doing. It wasn’t language. And I was shocked.

He looked Mayan and I thought, well, if he knew Mexican sign language, he wouldn’t try to copy. That’s not a normal thing to do, even if you don’t know the language. I couldn’t walk away. I slowly figured out that this man had no language. As I said, I could see that he was very intelligent. I could see he was trying very hard. I was twenty-two years old. I had no idea of what I was doing. I was faced with how to communicate the idea of language to someone without language."

The man she would call, ‘Ildefonso,’ had figured out how to survive, in part by simply copying those around him, but he had no idea what language was. Schaller found that he observed people’s lips and mouth moving, unaware that they were making sound, unaware that there was sound, trying to figure out what was happening from the movements of the mouths. She felt that he was frustrated because he thought everyone else could figure things out from looking at each others’ moving mouths.

One problem for Schaller’s efforts was that Ildefonso’s survival strategy, imitation, actually got in the way of him learning how to sign because it short-circuited the possibility of conversation. As she puts it, Ildefonso acted as if he had a kind of visual echolalia (we sometimes call it ‘echopraxia’), simply copying the actions he saw:

"He’d just try to form signs and copy what I was doing. But his facial expression was always, is this what I’m supposed to do?

That question was on his face all of the time. It was terribly frustrating. It went on hour after hour, for days and days and days. Then I had an idea. If I died tonight, I may have had only one truly brilliant thought in my life. What was it that attracted me to this man? His intelligence and his studiousness, the fact he was still trying to figure things out-those two things.

I decided to stop talking to him. Instead, I taught an invisible student. I set up a chair, and I started being the teacher to an invisible student in an empty chair. Then I became the student. I would get into the other chair and the student would answer the teacher. I did this over and over and over. And I ignored him. I stopped looking at him."

Even with the ‘brilliant idea,’ the road ahead was hard, and Schaller talks about wondering when one of them was going to give up. Finally, they had a breakthrough moment:

"What happened is that I saw a movement. I stopped. I was talking to an empty chair, but out of my peripheral vision I saw something move. I look at Ildefonso and he had just become rigid! He actually sat up in his chair and became rigid. His hands were flat on the table and his eyes were wide. His facial expression was different from any I’d seen. It was just wide with amazement!

And then he started-it was the most emotional moment with another human being, I think, in my life so that even now, after all these years, I’m choking up [pauses]-he started pointing to everything in the room, and this is amazing to me! I’ve thought about this for years. It’s not having language that separates us from other animals, it’s because we love it! All of a sudden, this twenty-seven-year-old man-who, of course, had seen a wall and a door and a window before-started pointing to everything. He pointed to the table. He wanted me to sign table. He wanted the symbol. He wanted the name for table. And he wanted the symbol, the sign, for window.

(..) But it’s not just a symbol. It’s a shared symbol. He can say “window” to someone else tomorrow who he hasn’t even met yet! And they will know what a window is. There’s something magical that happens between humans and symbols and the sharing of symbols.

That was his first “Aha!” He just went crazy for a few seconds, pointing to everything in the room and signing whatever I signed. Then he collapsed and started crying, and I don’t mean just a few tears. He cradled his head in his arms on the table and the table was shaking loudly from his sobbing. Of course, I don’t know what was in his head, but I’m just guessing he saw what he had missed for twenty-seven years."
(..)
Ildefonso clearly was capable of all sorts of tasks that suggest he was not mentally inert or completely vacant. He had survived into adulthood, crossed into the US, kept himself from being mowed down in traffic or starving to death. Moreover, he and other languageless individuals had apparently figured out ways to communicate without a shared language, which I find both phenomenally intriguing and difficult to even imagine (putting aside the definitional problem of distinguishing human communication from ‘language’ broadly construed).

So can people have thought without words? Well, the evidence-based answer would seem to be, yes (..). Some things appear to be easier to ‘get’ without language (such as imitation of action), other things appear to be a kind of ‘all-at-once’ intuition (such as suddenly realizing all things have names), and other ideas are difficult without language being deeply enmeshed with cognitive development over long periods of time (like an English-based understanding of time as quantitative and spatialized).

The case of Ildefonso suggests that not all ‘thought’ is either neurologically or practically similar. Ildefonso had managed to survive, and clearly had thoughts, but he was also obviously confused by some basic qualities of the language-saturated world in which he had to live, not least of which was social interaction. Even without very basic capacities – like, apparently, naming itself, the seemingly first act of applying a symbolic icon to a recurring element in perceptually reality – he managed in day-to-day life and was emphatically ‘human,’ although operating with unusual cognitive capacities.
 
 
( Post a new comment )
cukursēne[info]saccharomyces on February 4th, 2013 - 08:18 pm
baiba diezgan pārliecinoši man apgalvoja, ka bez valodas domāšana neesot iespējama, un minēja visādus savus iemīļotos autorus, kas esot filosofijas megaautoritātes un tā saka, un arī iepriekš kādi draugi-biedri-pionieri ir izteikuši tāda paša virziena idejas, no kā tad es secinu, ka pastāv tāda tendence.

bet nu es arī vairāk sliecos domāt, ka valoda ir tika viens veids, kādā domas strukturēt, un viens no galvenajiem veidiem, kā ar tām dalīties. viens no, manuprāt, neapšaubāmākajiem argumentiem par šo ir tas, ka valoda ir lineāra, bet domāšana nav - cilvēks var pāris sekundēs izdomāt domu, kuru ietvert valodā aizņem ilgu laiku (nu, kā tas piemērs par zemnieku, kurš izejot meža pļaviņā īsā mirklī aptver situāciju un jau ir izdomājis visu, kas tur būtu jādara, lai iekoptu lauciņu, bet lai to visu pastāstītu kādam citam, vajag runāt un runāt)

un arī tas human exceptionalism, kas pamatā šādai dzīvnieku uztverei man liekas apšaubāms un nejauks, i mean, tā ir totāla savu kritēriju universalizēšana, vērtējot dzīvniekus pēc tā, kā viņiem, mūsuprāt, nav (saziņas sistēmas, ko mēs gribētu atzīt par valodu utt) : tad jau tikpat labi var paskatīties uz cilvēkiem ekvivalenti no dzīvnieku "skatpunkta" - ne mēs redzam ultravioleto vai infrasarkano starojumu, ne jūtam zemes elektromagnētisko lauku tā, lai varētu pēc tā orientēties, reāli visai nožēlojami.
kam tur bija tas citāts par "if you judge fish by its capability to climb a tree you will inevitably deem it a failure" vai kaut kā tā.
(Reply) (Parent) (Thread) (Link)
[info]methodrone on February 4th, 2013 - 09:30 pm
ljoti pareizi. un veel, vinji runaa taa it kaa domas buutu kas tik grandiozs un 'labaaks'. taada bezdomu apzinja, kaada radaas tam zemniekam, un apkaartnes izjushana ir, manupraat, daudz preciizaaka un ontologjiskaaka, autentiskaaka par vaardiskaam domaam, jo saakumaa jau mees pasauli uztveram caur kjermeni un tikai tad sashkjobam caur visaadiem lingvistiskiem konceptiem. so jaa, domaat var arii ar manjaam.

jaa, to teica Einshteins, un taa ir
(Reply) (Parent) (Thread) (Link)
briinumcepuminjsh[info]french_mime on February 4th, 2013 - 10:36 pm
kaa tu tieshi domaa 'ontologjiskaaka'?
(Reply) (Parent) (Thread) (Link)
[info]methodrone on February 4th, 2013 - 10:57 pm
taa, ka apzinja par kaut ko, pirms paarveersta vaardos, ir 'reaalaaka'. taa, ka vaardi paarveersh dazhaadas percepcijas konceptos, kas nav privaati, bet kulturaali sagjenereeti, un izbojaa visu jauko autiskumu. un tad tas ir cits realitaates liimenis, attaalaaks no ontologjiskaas realitaates, paarveerties sociaalajaa realitaatee
(Reply) (Parent) (Thread) (Link)
[info]methodrone on February 4th, 2013 - 11:07 pm
autentiskumu
(Reply) (Parent) (Link)
briinumcepuminjsh[info]french_mime on February 5th, 2013 - 12:52 am
no psihologjijas perpektiivas tos immediate, instinktiivos perceptus nemaz vairs nav iespeejams izoleet no valodas sisteemas, jo pat ja tu skaties uz sarkanu kraasu un piedziivo to kaa neverbaalu sajuutu, to nav iespeejams noskhjirt no visa paareejaa asociatiivaa network. tas ir, mees vairs nevaram atgriezties taadaa pirmatneejaa staavoklii, kad tie percepti ir reaali un autentiski un totali nesaistiiti un nodaliiti no higher level simboliskaas domas siteemas,.
(Reply) (Parent) (Thread) (Link)
[info]methodrone on February 5th, 2013 - 01:58 am
jaa, bet lai arii tie percepti vairs nav 'pure' un kaut kaadi saakotneeji, vinji ir patiesi in itself, kameer vinji nav interpreteeeti un piepildiiti ar meanings. nu taa, ka vinji ir ljoti lidziigi, nu taas reaali ir sajuutas vairaak kaa domas. un tur un taa jau tas notiek, ka sanaak ka sajuutas nevar buut domas, taads duaalisms, bet es domaaju, ka var, sajuutas ir tiiraakas domas. bet pashas sajuutas, protams, ir veidojushaas tagad kaa atbilde uz konceptualizeetaam domaam. tas taads rinjkjis.
(Reply) (Parent) (Link)
cukursēne[info]saccharomyces on February 5th, 2013 - 12:29 am
bet kāpēc tai obligāti jābūt "bezdomu" apziņai, kāpēc tā nevar būt vnk neverbāla doma? šis gan laikam tāds tīri terminolõģijas jautājums, jo liekas, ka mums ir diezgan saskanīgi viedokļi par underlying principles
(Reply) (Parent) (Thread) (Link)
[info]methodrone on February 5th, 2013 - 12:36 am
shkjiet, ka tas ir terminologjijas jautaajums nudien. man tikai shkjiet, ka neverbaalaas domas ir tik netveramas, un tik strauji veershas verbaalaas domaas, ka vinjaam vajag citu apziimeejumu. bet jaa, taa ir domaashana, jo tai piemiit saakums, un kaut kaada virziiba, un intentionality.
(Reply) (Parent) (Link)