21 Augusts 2009 @ 01:53
Par ko domā filozofi:  
Abstract:
In her (1996) Kadri Vihvelin argues that autoinfanticide is nomologically impossible and so that there is no sense in which time travelers are able to commit it. In response, Theodore Sider (2002) defends the original Lewisian verdict (Lewis 1976) whereby, on a common understanding of ability, time travelers are able to kill their earlier selves and their failure to do so is merely coincidental. This paper constitutes a critical note on arguments put forward by both Sider and Vihvelin. I argue that although Sider’s criticism starts out promisingly he doesn’t succeed in establishing that Vihvelin’s analysis fails, because (a) he neglects to rule out a class of counterfactuals to which Vihvelin’s sample-case may belong; and (b) (together with Lewis) he is wrong to suggest that future facts are irrelevant in the evaluation of time travelers’ abilities. I show instead that Vihvelin’s argument is viciously circular, indicating that even if there are nomological constraints on autoinfanticide these cannot be established a priori.

Sīkāk http://www.springerlink.com/content/l032533401206271/?p=84544035b2f74d19af86f2108100da9e&pi=0
 
 
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None of the Above[info]artis on 21. Augusts 2009 - 04:46
Paldies, interesanti. Un sasodīts, pārdomājot šo jautājumu, nonācu pie akurāt tāda risinājuma kā Lewis 1976. Kārtējais individuālais atklājums, kur citi par desmitgadēm aizsteigušies priekšā. Oh well, I have a few tricks up my sleeve.
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thel[info]thel on 21. Augusts 2009 - 11:42
Jā, šis ir labs. Biju pat iedomājies palasīties pirms gulētiešanas, taču 34 naudiņas ir nedaudz par daudz.
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