Atgriežoties pie agrāk izteiktajiem pārmetumiem, kas nāca no liberālā feminisma puses, piemēram, par to, ka tā pozīcija, kuru pārstāvu nozīmē, ka sieviete ir staigājoša dzemde. Vairākkart esmu mēģinājusi rakstīt, ka tas ir aplami, bet, iespējams, darīju to nemākulīgi un ne pietiekami pārliecinoši, tāpēc ik pa laikam cenšos piefiksēt jaunus veidus kādos vēl varētu par to runāt.
Tieši šis punkts, nesen atklāju, ir iztirzāts Holly Lawford-Smith rakstā ar nosaukumu "Who is feminism for?" Ielikšu šeit dažus fragmentus no raksta, pilnā versija, ja rodas interese, ir šeit https://www.philosophersmag.com/essays/314-who-is-feminism-for Holly Lawford Smith ir filosofijas profesore, kura šobrīd strādā Melburnas Universitātē.



"Feminists forty/fifty years ago worried about essentialist definitions of “woman” because they associated them with the idea of biological determinism, thinking that whatever property was named as the essential one would slip from being merely descriptive (what she is) to being normative (what she should be, or should do). For example, if “woman” means “person capable of motherhood”, that might slide into “person who should be a mother”, person who, if not a mother, is somehow aberrant, abnormal, a failure. They worried about universalist definitions of “woman” because they worried about exclusion. To continue with the same example, if “woman” means “person capable of motherhood”, then people not capable of motherhood, including infertile women and post-menopausal women, are not women. But we generally think that infertile and post-menopausal women are women, so this definition is exclusionary: it doesn’t include some people that it should include."

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"Still, there’s a big difference between defining “woman” as “person capable of motherhood”, and defining “woman” as “adult human female”. The latter is a definition in terms of sex, and it’s essentialist and universalist. But the essential property can’t easily slide from descriptive to normative. She is an adult human female; she, the adult human female, should be someone who doesn’t go about casually murdering her enemies. Similarly, there’s no meaningful sense in which a frog should be a frog. It just is one. If there are normative questions, they come later; about what she should do, or be like."


Man šis liekas ļoti precīzi. Sieviete tāda ir jau pirms viņa kļūst māte un arī tad, ja viņa nekad nekļūst par māti. No dzimšanas un pat pirms dzimšanas (jau mammas vēderā).


"Gender identity replacing sex is not more inclusive, it’s just differently inclusive. If feminism is about sex then it includes females who do not identify with/as women, namely transmen and female nonbinary people. If it’s about gender identity then it excludes those females, and instead includes males who do identify with/as women, namely transwomen. This is a cost to those who are women understood as a sex but not women understood as a gender identity, because they experience a disproportionately high rate of sexual assault, and that is something feminism is paradigmatically concerned with. Gender identity replacing sex also leaves out all the women who don’t have a gender identity. That is at least all those women who lack the cognitive capacity to form a self-conception in terms of masculinity, femininity, both, or neither (a point made by Elizabeth Barnes in her 2020 paper “Gender and Gender Terms”). But it may be a much larger number of women: radical and gender-critical feminists, for example, say that they do not have gender identities."


Dzimtes identitāte tiek uzspiesta visiem kā kaut kas reāls, reālāks par bioloģisko dzimumu, gender ideologi reizēm lieto to, manuprāt, aplamo skaidrojumu, ka dzimums ir tas, kas 'ir stap kājām' un dzimte tā, kas 'ir starp ausīm'. Cilvēks ir bioloģiska būtne viscaur, nav tā, ka starp ausīm viņa bioloģija pēkšņi apstājas un tur mājo tikai sociālā identitāte. Tas būtu savā ziņā līdzīgi, ja man pēkšņi pavisam nopietni būtu jāņem vērā sava horoskopa zīme un jāatzīst, ka tagad, atskatoties uz visu savu dzīvi, es redzu - jā, es esmu bijis tipisks mežāzis, vai arī, ja zīmes pārklājas, tipisks mežāzis/strēlnieks, vārdu sakot, fluid. Kā jau sacīju, ir cilvēki ar psiholoģiskām promblēmām un viņiem ir nepieciešama palīdzība, anrokesijas gadījumā ārsts neārstē, veicot liposakciju un neprasa visai pārējai sabiedrībai akceptēt melus, ka ar anoreksiju sirgstošais ir resns.


"The common view that gender identity does the same job as sex and is more inclusive, then, is wrong. But suppose that we decide we care more about the inclusion of transwomen than about the exclusion of females without “woman” gender identities, and so are happy to make the switch - that is, we’re happy to be differently inclusive instead of more inclusive. Are the interests of the women who both groups overlap on (females who identify as women) equally well-served by this switch? I don’t think so. There are various paradigmatically feminist concerns relating directly to sex that can’t be captured as a matter of gender identity, like sex-selective abortion, child marriage, female genital mutilation, and abortion. In delivering some males to feminism, gender identity introduces substantially more difference into feminism’s constituency, which undermines existing commonalities. Feminist language will shift so as not to presume a woman’s sex, and this is likely to end up occluding sex differences that matter. If feminism is for women and “woman” is a gender identity, then feminism is a mixed-sex project."


Raksta autori, starp citu, drīz varētu piemeklēt līdzīgs liktenis kā Kathleen Stock, viņu arī mēģina izstumt no darba vietas par uzskatiem saistībā ar dzimumu. Melburnas Universiāte arī ir nopublicējusi savu LGBTIQA+ Inclusion Action Plan 2023-2026. Fragments no šī plāna:



Es vēlētos uzzināt kā tieši tiks panākts "eliminate misgendering" - vai tiem cilvēkiem, kas pareizi noteiks personu dzimumu un lietos dzimumam atbilstošus vietniekvārdus piemēros kaut kādu sodu vai vienkārši izslēgs no universitātes.