11. Oktobris 2014

• 2014.10.11, 09:21
• "The premise of the headline is a very common invalid argument that goes like this:
  1) Declare (usually implicitly) with no basis whatsoever that term X has this One True Meaning.
  2) Demonstrate that a common instance of things generally subsumed under term X does not have the properties implied by the arbitrary and baseless One True Meaning (implicitly) declared in step one.
  3) "Conclude" that therefore the common instance of X is not "really" X.
  The key that this is nonsense is the use of the metaphysically loaded weasel-word "really". OK, if we aren't "really" conscious are we still just-plain-old conscious? How about conscious-enough-for-going-on-with?
  The argument depends on a Platonic view of concepts, which is false (if it was true it would never be possible to create a new concept, which people in Plato's time almost never did, but we do all the time.)
  "Consciousness" does not identify some Platonic form or Aristotelian essence, but [...]"
  
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