* Innateness. To what extent is knowledge innate or acquired by experience? Is human behavior shaped primarily by nature or nurture?
* Language of thought. Does the human brain operate with a language-like code or with a more general connectionist architecture? What is the relation between symbolic cognitive models using rules and concepts and sub-symbolic models using neural networks?
* Mental imagery. Do human minds think with visual and other kinds of imagery, or only with language-like representations?
* Folk psychology. Does a person's everyday understanding of other people consist of having a theory of mind, or of merely being able to simulate them?
* Meaning. How do mental representations acquire meaning or mental content? To what extent does the meaning of a representation depend on its relation to other representations, its relation to the world, and its relation to a community of thinkers?
* Mind-brain identity. Are mental states brain states? Or can they be multiply realized by other material states? What is the relation between psychology and neuroscience? Is materialism true?
* Free will. Is human action free or merely caused by brain events?
* Moral psychology. How do minds/brains make ethical judgments?
* The meaning of life. How can minds construed naturalistically as brains find value and meaning?
* Emotions. What are emotions, and what role do they play in thinking?
* Mental illness. What are mental illnesses, and how are psychological and neural processes relevant to their explanation and treatment?
* Appearance and reality. How do minds/brains form and evaluate representations of the external world?
* Social science. How do explanations of the operations of minds interact with explanations of the operations of groups and societies?

Tags: cognitive science, philosophy

1.nodaļa. par to, kas cilvēks ir
laime, pašnāvība, pietikšana ar sevi, iekšējais, ārējais, degradējoši netikumi, kustība, brīva vaļa
2.nodaļa. par to, kas cilvēkam pieder
1)dabiskās un nepieciešamās vajadzības(ēst, apģērbs)
2)dabiskās un ne-nepieciešamās vajadzības(sex)
3)nedabiskās, ne-nepieciešamās vajadzības(greznība)
nabadzība/bagātība
3.nodaļa. par to, ko cilvēks priekšstata
vieta, kur mēs esam citiem, ir sveša apziņa: tas ir priekšstats kurā izpaužamiesm līdztekkus jēdzieniem, kas tiek uz to attiecināti
individualitāte=daudz nozīmībāka par nacionalitāti
priekšstatīt godu, rangu, slavu
pilsoniskais gods, amata un dzimuma gods
rupjība, dūres gods(bruņinieciskais goda princips nav sākotnējs un nesakņojas pašā cilvēka iedabā, jo piem sengrieķi uz dūri atbild ar gudrību)
pilsoniskais gods - pastāv citu viedoklī par mums.
bruņinieciskais gods - mūsu viedoklī, ka no mums nav jābaidās
slava ir mirstīgā goda nemirstīgā māsa
Šopenhauers nodi*š Hēgeli
Pūļa prāti ir pārāk nožēlojama arēna, lai tajā sev vietu atrastu īsta laime
mūsu uzmanība vēršama nevis uz baudām un patīkamo dzīvē, bet gan uz to, lai pēc iespējas izvairītos
dzīvot laimīgi=dzīvot mazāk nelaimīgi, ciešami
sāpju prombūtne ir dzīves laimīgs mērogs
baudījumi ir himeriski
cilvēkus dara sabieddriskus nespēja izturēt vientulību
cilvēka sabiedriskums ir aptuveni apgriezti proporcionāls viņa intelektuālajai vērtībai
vientulības mīlestība nav radusies dabiski, bet no gūtās pieredzes un refleksijas par to
sociis malorum - sabiedrotie nelaimē
ho bios en tēj kinēsei esti(vita motu constat)- dzīvība ir kustībā(Aristotelis)
ir jānodarbojas ar jēdzieniem nevis fantāzijām
veselība kā svarīgākais faktors mūsu laimē

Tags: gods, laime, sabiedrība, šopenhauers

"Another reason some people believe it is ethical to interfere with a person's right to think about or commit suicide is belief in mental illness. But a so-called diagnosis of "mental illness" is a value judgment about a person's thinking or behavior, not a diagnosis of bona-fide brain disease. So-called mental illness does not deprive people of free will, but on the contrary is an expression of free will"

http://www.antipsychiatry.org/suicide.htm

Tags: free will, suicide

David Hume, for example, defines liberty as “a power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will.”

Tags: free will

Parādība = sajūtu dati
Realitāte/matērija/fiziskā eksistence - nepieejams
Fiziski objekti kā sajūtu cēloņi
Krāsa - atkarīgs no radzeni sasniegtajiem gaismas viļņiem
Bērklija ideālisms, "idejas." koks dieva prātā.
Izziņa pēc iepazītā(pēc atmiņas/introspekcija. ņem vērā - ārējo&iekšējo sajūtu dati) un izziņa pēc apraksta(nenoteiktais un noteiktais apraksts. universālijas. īpašvārdi)
Indukcija. Vispārējais likums ir patiess, tad atsevišķais gadījums ir patiess. Atsevišķais gadījums var būt patiess, ja vispārējais likums tāds nav.
Tuvošanās drošticamībai
Indukcijas principu neatspēko atsaukšanās uz pieredzi
Loģiskie principi:
1)Identitātes likums - viss, kas ir, ir;
2)Pretrunas likums - nekas nespēj gan būt, gan nebūt;
3)Trešā izslēgtā likums - visam vajag vai nu būt, vai nebūt.
Empīriķi, visas zināšanas iegūtas no pieredzes. Loks, Bērklijs, Hjūms
Racionālisti, līdzās zināmajam no pieredzes pastāv "iedzimtas idejas/principi"
A prioras ir gan loģikas un tīrās matemātikas nostādnes, gan arī ētikas fundamentālās nostādnes
8.nodaļa. Kā iespējamas a prioras zināšanas
Analītisks - predikāts iegūstams ar subjekta analīzi
Kantam - fenomens ir objekts, kas atrodas apziņā
Platona "ideja"(universālija) - tīrā būtība(baltums, taisnīgums)
Arī līdzīguma attiecība = universālija
Universālijas nav domas, bet domu objekti
Attiecības tāpat kā jēdzieni, starp kuriem tās pastāv, nav atkarīgas no mūsu domām, bet atrodas neatkarīgajā pasaulē
Kaut arī vispārīgās nostādnes ir a priori, to attiecināšana uz reāliem īpatņiem ir saistīta ar pieredzi(=> satur empīriskus datus)
Vispārīgie principi(universālijas) un atsevišķie īpatņi
Uztveres patiesības - nepastarpināti gūtas no sajūtām
Patiesība un aplamums, kas piemīt pārliecībai ir atkarīgs no pārliecības attiecības ar citām lietām/norisēm, nevis no kādām kvalitātēm, kas iekšēji piemīt pārliecībai
pārliecība = noteikta veida atbilstība starp pārliecību un faktu
Lai kāda attiecība pastāvētu starp 2 vai vairākiem terminiem, tā savieno šos terminus kompleksā veselumā(Ottello mīl Dezdemonu = Ottelo mīlestība(1) pret Dezdemonu(2))
Visur, kur pastāv kāda attiecība, kas saattiecina noteiktus terminus, ir jābūt kompleksam, ko veido šo terminu apvienojums(tā pat arī otrādi)
Ja Otello ir kļūdaina pārliecība, ka ka Dezdemona mīl Kasio, tad komplekss veselums "Dezdemona mīl Kasio" nepastāv
=> Pārliecība ir patiesa, ja tā atbilst noteiktam saistītam kompleksam, un aplama, ja tam neatbilst(patiesības/aplamības definīcijas)
a)pārliecību eksistence ir atkarīga no apziņas
b)to patiesums nav atkarīgs no apziņas
Objekttermini(Dezdemone, Kasio) un objektattiecības = pārliecībai atbilstošs fakts
Patiesa pārliecība nav zināšanas, kur tā deducēta no aplamas pārliecības
"Psiholoģiskā atvedināšana" - pāreja no iespiestajiem burtiem pie to nozīmes
Zināšanas(pārliecības, kas atbilst patiesībai) iegūtas intuitīvi vai ar atvedināšanas(loģiskas/psiholoģiskas) palīdzību no intuitīvām zināšanām, no kurām tās izriet loģiski
Maldi, tas, par ko esam stingri pārliecināti, bet nav patiess
Ticams viedoklis(kas nav neapšaubāmas zināšanas) - stingras pārliecības, kas nav nedz zināšanas, nedz maldi. Pārliecinātībai piemīt zināmas bažas, jo atvedinātas no kaut kā, kam nepiemīt augstākā pašsaprotamības pakāpe
Pēc Hēgeļa - no jebkuras atsevišķas realitātes daļas ir jāredz, kādai ir jābūt realitātei kopumā
Kants deducē telpas un laika neiespējamību, pasludinot tos par subjektīviem lielumiem
Fizisku objektu gadījumā pats princips, ka sajūtu dati ir fizisku ir fizisku objektu zīmes ir universāliju savienojums. => pieredze ļauj gūt zināšanas par fiziskiem objektiem
Intuitīvās zināšanas - tīri empīriskas(stāsta par atsevišķo iepazīto lietu eksistenci un dažām to īpašībām) un tīrās a priori zināšanas(sniedz universāliju savienojumus, ļauj izdarīt atvedinājumus no empīriskajās zināšanās dotajiem atsevišķajiem faktiem)
"Lai gan filozofija samazina drošības izjūtu par to, kādas lietas patiesībā ir, tomēr tā ievērojami paplašina zināšanas par to, kādas tās varētu būt"

Tags: loģika, rasels
Current Music: -

What is known as the history of concepts is really the history either of our knowledge of concepts or of the meanings of words.

[..]always to seperate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective; never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition; never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object.

[..]if we come only on general logical laws and on definitions, than the truth is an analytic one[..]if however it is impossible to give the proof without making use of truths which are not of a general logical nature, but belong to the sphere of some special science, then proposition is a synthetic one. For a truth to be a posteriori, it must be impossible to construct a proof of it without including an appeal to facts, i.e., to truths which cannot be proved and are not general since they contain assertions of particular objects. But ir, on the contrary, it`s truth can be derived exclusively from general laws, which themselves neither need nor admit of proof, than the truth is a priori.

[..]numerical formulae can be derived from the definitions of the individual numbers alone by means of a few general laws, and that these definitions neither assert observed facts nor pressupose them for their legitimacy.

[..]That if we pour 2 unit volumes of liquid into 5 unit volumes of liquide we shall have 7 unit volumes of liquid, is not the meaning of the proposition 5 + 2 = 7, but an application of it, which only holds good provided that no alteration of volume occurs as a result, say, of some chemical reaction.

[..]"The whole of aritmetics is innate and is in virtual fashion in us" (Leibniz)

[..]Empirical propositions hold good of what is physically or psychologically actual, the truths of geometry govern all that is spatially intuitable, whether actual or product of our fancy.[..] Axioms of geometry are independent of one another and of primitive laws of logic, and consequently are synthetic.

[..]Newton proposes to understand by number not so much a set of units as the relation in the abstract between any given magnitude and another magnitude of the same kind which is taken as unity

[..]the view of M.Cantor, when he calls mathematics an empiric science in so far as it begins with the consideration of things in the external world. On his view, number originates only by abstraction from objects.

[..]an important difference between colour and Number, that a colour such as blue belongs to a surface independently of any choice of ours. The blue colour is a power of reflecting light of certain wavelenghts; to this our way of regarding it cannot make the slightest difference. The Number 1, on the other hand, or 100 or any other Number, cannot be said to belong to the pile of playing cards in its own right, but at most to belong to it in view of the way in which we have chosen to regard it

[..]Leibniz rejects the view of the schoolmen that number is not applicable to immaterial things, and calls number a sort of immaterial figure, which results from the union of things of any sorts whatsoever, for example of God, an angel, a man and motion, which together are four. For which reason he holds that number is of supreme universality and belongs to metaphysics[..]"thus number is, as it were, a kind of metaphysical figure."

[..]While for Mill the number is something physical, for Locke and Leibniz it exists only as a notion.

[..]Berkley: "It ought to be considered that number... is nothing fixed and settled, really existing in things themselves. It is entirely the creature of the mind, or any combination of ideas to which it gives one name, and so makes it pass for a unit."

[..]I understand objective to mean what is independent of our sensation, intuition and imagination, and of all construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations, but not what is independent of reason.

[..]number is neither spatial and physical[..]nor yet subjective like ideas, but non-sensible and objective.

[..]W.S. Jevons: "It has often been said that units are units in respect of being perfectly similar to one another; but though they may be perfectly similar in some respects, they must be different in at least one point, otherwise they would be incapable of plurality. If three coins were so similar that they occupied the same place at the same time, they would not be three coins but one."

[..]not every objective object has a place.

[..]

Tags: concepts, frege, logic

"And might there not also be some reader who would say 'I accept A and B as true, but I don't accept the Hypothetical?"
"Certainly there might. He, also, had better take to football."
"And neither of these readers," the Tortoise continued, "is as yet under any logical necessity to accept Z as true?"
"Quite so," Achilles assented.
"Well, now, I want you to consider me as a reader of the second kind, and to force me, logically, to accept Z as true."
"A tortoise playing football would be -- " Achilles was beginning "-- an anomaly, of course"

Tags: football, lewis carrol, logic
Current Music: -

A usage is a custom, practice, fashion or vogue. It can be local or widespread, obsolete or current, rural or urban, vulgar or academic. There cannot be a misusage any more than there can be a miscustom or a misvogue.By contrast, a way of operating with a razor blade, a word, a traveller's cheque or a canoe-paddle is a technique, knack or method.
[..]Descriptions of usages presuppose descriptions of use
[..]We can ask whether a person knows how to use and how not misuse a certain word. But we cannot ask whether he knows how to use a certain sentence
[..]Sentences and clauses make sense or make no sense, where words neither do nor do not make sense, but only have meanings

Inter-theory negotiations can be and may have to be conducted in pre-theory dictions.
[..] philosophers, unlike other professionals and specialists, are constantly jettisoning in toto(entirely) all the technical terms of their own predecessors
[..]A theory is formalized when it is translated out of the natural language (untechnical, technical or semi-technical), in which it was originally excogitated, into a deliberately constructed notation, the notation, perhaps of Principia Mathematica.

Tags: "usage", "use", linguistics, ordinary language, philology, ryle
Current Music: Minuteman - Cohesion

"In the title essay of For the New Intellectual, discussing modern philosophy's concerted attack on man's mind, I referred to the philosophers' division into two camps, "those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge of the world by deducing it exclusively from concepts, which come from inside his head and are not derived from the perception of physical facts (the Rationalists) -and those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts (the Empiricists). To put it more simply: those who joined the Witch Doctor, by abandoning reality - and those who clung to reality, by abandoning their mind."
(fallacy of false alternatives -->)
Poll #18568 Emp/Rac
Open to: All, results viewable to: All

tu vairāk <3 vai vairāk esi(pēc izvēles)

Tags: empiricist, perception, rationalist
Current Music: Zola Jesus ft. Dead Luke - somebody to love cover

distinguishing physicalism (a linguistic thesis) from materialism (a metaphysical thesis)

Tags: materialism, physicalism