Despite the fact that we see the world with different clarity and from a different point of view and therefore that for each of us things have a different physical appearance – I might see one side of a car while you might see the other side – I assume that we end up with the same objective world (Husserl, 1998: 55–6; 1969: 233).6 For Husserl, this common world is an accomplishment that is made possible first of all by empathy (Einfühlung), understood as the primordial experience of participating in the actions and feeling of another being without becoming the other (Husserl, 1969: 233; Stein, 1989). This kind of empathetic (and hence non-rational, non-cognitive) understanding of Others comes out of our exposure to their bodies moving and acting in ways that we recognize as similar to the ways in which we would act under similar circumstances.

(Alessandro Duranti "Husserl, Intersubjectivity and Anthropology")