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Wed 16.02.11 | 20:38
"As an example, let's think of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The hijackers' success in getting knives through airport security was not a mechanism failure but a policy one; at that time, knives with blades up to three inches were permitted, and the screeners did their task of keeping guns and explosives off as far as we know. Policy has changed since then: first to prohibit all knives, then most weapons (baseball bats are now forbidden but whiskey bottles are OK); it's flip-flopped on many details (butane lighters forbidden then allowed again). Mechanism is weak, because of things like composite knives and explosives that don't contain nitrogen. Assurance is always poor; many tons of harmless passengers' possessions are consigned to the trash each month, while well below half of all the weapons taken through screening (whether accidentally or for test purposes) are picked up.
Serious analysts point out major problems with priorities. For example, the TSA has spent $14.7 billion on aggressive passenger screening, which is fairly ineffective, while $100 m spent on reinforcing cockpit doors would remove most of the risk [1024]. The President of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance notes that most ground staff aren't screened, and almost no care is taken to guard aircraft parked on the ground overnight. As most airliners don't have locks, there's not much to stop a bad guy wheeling steps up to a plane and placing a bomb on board; if he had piloting skills and a bit of chutzpah, he could file a flight plan and make off with it [820]. Yet screening staff and guarding planes are just not a priority.
Why are such poor policy choices made? Quite simply, the incentives on the decision makers favour visible controls over effective ones. The result is what Bruce Schneier calls ‘security theatre’—measures designed to produce a feeling of security rather than the reality. Most players also have an incentive to exaggerate the threat from terrorism: politicians to scare up the vote, journalists to sell more papers, companies to sell more equipment, government officials to build their empires, and security academics to get grants. The upshot of all this is that most of the damage done by terrorists to democratic countries comes from the overreaction. Fortunately, electorates figure this out over time. In Britain, where the IRA bombed us intermittently for a generation, the public reaction to the 7/7 bombings was mostly a shrug."
Security Engineering, Ross J. Anderson
[820] D Mackett, A Pilot on Airline Security, in Hot Air, July 16 2007, at http://hotair.com/archives/2007/07/1
[1024] Z Phillips, Security Theater, in Government Executive Aug 1, 2007, at http://www.govexec.com/features/080
Grāmata, starp citu, ļoti interesanta.
Pirmo izdevumu var internetā dabūt par brīvu.
Autors - liberālis grib, lai arī otro, papildināto versiju var dabūt par brīvu, bet izdevniecība, maita, neļauj :), tāpēc tikai dažas nodaļas pieejamas, t.sk. par terrrrorismu, kas ir viena no pievienotajām nodaļām par godu 9/11.
šeit - http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.htm
Serious analysts point out major problems with priorities. For example, the TSA has spent $14.7 billion on aggressive passenger screening, which is fairly ineffective, while $100 m spent on reinforcing cockpit doors would remove most of the risk [1024]. The President of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance notes that most ground staff aren't screened, and almost no care is taken to guard aircraft parked on the ground overnight. As most airliners don't have locks, there's not much to stop a bad guy wheeling steps up to a plane and placing a bomb on board; if he had piloting skills and a bit of chutzpah, he could file a flight plan and make off with it [820]. Yet screening staff and guarding planes are just not a priority.
Why are such poor policy choices made? Quite simply, the incentives on the decision makers favour visible controls over effective ones. The result is what Bruce Schneier calls ‘security theatre’—measures designed to produce a feeling of security rather than the reality. Most players also have an incentive to exaggerate the threat from terrorism: politicians to scare up the vote, journalists to sell more papers, companies to sell more equipment, government officials to build their empires, and security academics to get grants. The upshot of all this is that most of the damage done by terrorists to democratic countries comes from the overreaction. Fortunately, electorates figure this out over time. In Britain, where the IRA bombed us intermittently for a generation, the public reaction to the 7/7 bombings was mostly a shrug."
Security Engineering, Ross J. Anderson
[820] D Mackett, A Pilot on Airline Security, in Hot Air, July 16 2007, at http://hotair.com/archives/2007/07/1
[1024] Z Phillips, Security Theater, in Government Executive Aug 1, 2007, at http://www.govexec.com/features/080
Grāmata, starp citu, ļoti interesanta.
Pirmo izdevumu var internetā dabūt par brīvu.
Autors - liberālis grib, lai arī otro, papildināto versiju var dabūt par brīvu, bet izdevniecība, maita, neļauj :), tāpēc tikai dažas nodaļas pieejamas, t.sk. par terrrrorismu, kas ir viena no pievienotajām nodaļām par godu 9/11.
šeit - http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.htm