| Rasels |
27. Mar 2012|02:03 |
Pirms dažām dienām, nespēdams lasīt obligātas drausmas, glābos, pieķeroties Rasela autobiogrāfijai, ko šovakar pabeidzu. Padalīšos ar dažiem haotiskiem iespaidiem.
Atmiņas ir par aptuveni 1876.–1967. gadu, kombinētas ar Rasela un Raselam rakstītām vēstulēm (+ dažām citām), kas lielākoties ir interesantas, un dažādām Rasela politiskām publikācijām, kas bieži garlaiko (jo tēma vairs nav īpaši aktuāla vai citu iemeslu dēļ). Autobiogrāfijas daļā raksta viņš par visu — gan par masturbācijas paradumiem, gan par mocīšanos ar Rasela paradoksu.
Par dažādām lietām līdz šim nezināju vispār neko — piemēram, par Rasela lomu T.S. Eliota dzīvē*, Vitgenšteina skarbo ietekmi uz Raselu**, Rasela sākotnējo hiperpuritānismu u. c. Filozofija grāmatā liekas drusku pamesta novārtā, bet to var saprast, ņemot vērā aizvien lielāko pievēršanos politiskajam aktīvismam, kas sākas ar sufražismu 20. gadsimta sākumā, pirmo kulmināciju sasniedz ar ieslodzījumu Pirmā pasaules kara laikā un beidzas ar cīņu pret Vjetnamas karu un tamlīdzīgām lietām 60. gados. Es zināju, ka viņš bija aktīvists, bet man nebija ne jausmas, ka tik radikāls un ka tik ilgi un konsekventi. Vārdu sakot, ir vērts lasīt.
On a related note: Makartnijs par Rasela ietekmi uz bītliem. :)
* „Mr Apollinax” ir par Raselu. Un: „I became great friends with him, and subsequently with his wife, whom he married early in 1915. As they were desperately poor, I lent them one of the two bedrooms in my flat, with the result that I saw a great deal of them.4 I was fond of them both, and endeavoured to help them in their troubles until I discovered that their troubles were what they enjoyed. I held some debentures nominally worth £3,000, in an engineering firm, which during the War naturally took to making munitions. I was much puzzled in my conscience as to what to do with these debentures, and at last I gave them to Eliot.”
** 1916. gadā Rasels kādā vēstulē raksta: „Do you remember that .. I wrote a lot of stuff about Theory of Knowledge, which Wittgenstein criticised with the greatest severity? His criticism, tho’ I don’t think you realised it at the time, was an event of first-rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. (..) ..Wittgenstein persuaded me that what wanted doing in logic was too difficult for me. So there was no really vital satisfaction of my philosophical impulse in that work, and philosophy lost its hold on me.” |
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