"Putin’s decision-making is almost formulaic. He sees almost every issue as first and foremost an intelligence problem. The intelligence services also happen, not coincidentally, to be the most capable organizations in Russia. Consequently, Putin’s use of them as the principal instruments of state power should come as no surprise.
While Kennan argued for blocking Soviet efforts at expansion, his approach was essentially defensive and reactive in nature. Only when Reagan came to office did the U.S. begin not just to confront, but move to roll-back Soviet power.
That shift in strategy was premised upon two main pillars. The first, and most well known, was a massive build-up in U.S. defenses that the Soviets were ultimately unable to match. The second key element of Reagan’s approach was most notably articulated by the president himself in a 1982 speech in the British House of Commons when he said, “The objective I propose is quite simple, to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of the free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, and to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.”
It was the Reagan’s decision to shift to an offensive strategy of building up our military strength while at the same time working through overt and covert means to support those resisting Moscow’s rule and fostering democratic ideals inside the Evil Empire itself that brought about Soviet defeat in the Cold War.
Reagan understood that the very idea of democracy was anathema to those who ruled the Soviet Union, and that the unleashing of the democratic virus would undermine the legitimacy of Soviet rule. Like tsars and Soviet general secretaries before him, Putin’s main concern is regime stability. Moreover, by virtue of his own actions in repressing internal dissent and mounting intelligence operations intended to denigrate democratic ideals and governments, Putin is indicating to us his understanding that the idea of democracy is his greatest vulnerability. That vulnerability is a weakness we can exploit if we are to force him to alter his behavior.
In short, we can make Putin think more about protecting his power than asserting it. There are, as in all such cases, risks inherent in such a strategy, to include enhanced repression of democratic forces within Russia – though it is hard to see how much difference this would make given that the Russian security services have already falsely branded them as being in league with foreign intelligence services. But the greater risk is to leave Putin unchecked and free to continue inflicting damage on the very ideals that are our greatest strength."
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/arti
"[T]he Kremlin believes that superiority in information operations will decide the global power struggle. To implement this vision, the Russian armed forces have established information warfare units in each military district. For example, the main target for the Western Military District information warfare unit is NATO and its member states. The purpose of these units is to undermine the adversary´s resistance before a military conflict and to maintain a dominant position once it has begun. It is important to note that the Kremlin doesn’t draw a distinction between peacetime and wartime; the informational confrontation is constant. The capabilities of these units are uneven; one may say they are currently weak. Still, with the determination inherent to the military and with the help of experience from GRU psychological operations, we may witness another wave of disinformation campaigns directed against our defense forces, population, and governments."
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_a
"One recent Saturday night, two drunk men sitting in a park waved Skinner over. One of the men was trying to console his friend Kenneth, whose girlfriend had kicked him out and taken away his car keys. Suddenly, Kenneth stood up and reached for Skinner, to embrace him. Skinner hugged back.
A few minutes later, Skinner described the scene to an officer-in-training. She was aghast. At the police academy, cops are trained how to position their bodies when interacting with members of the public—one shoulder forward, gun hip always out of reach.
“I know—I lost tactical advantage,” Skinner told her.
“Yeah!” the trainee said.
Skinner smiled. “I’m not looking for tactical,” he said. “I’m looking for strategic.” ♦
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2
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