| 12:54p |
filozofi, zinātnieki, šizofrēniķi
"..in schizophrenia there is 'the sheer sense that this event is in certain respects a copy of some prototype...like some Platonic or noumenal essence, lying behind the merely phenomenal world one directly experiences.' As Cutting says, the patient talks like a philosopher (or some philosophers talk like patients): both draw excessively on the left hemisphere mode of being in the world.
Concrete instances are always unique; only an abstraction can be general. The abstractions, for which the left hemisphere has an affinity, are derived from the unique incarnate cases taken in by the right hemisphere, and are therefore secondary to them. Yet from the left hemisphere's own viewpoint, not having insight into what the right hemisphere knows, the situation appears reversed, and abstractions come to appear, in Platonic fashion, more real than the real-world instances from which they are derived. Thus the dramatist Antonin Artaud, who suffered from schizophrenia, remarked: 'I go from the abstract to the concrete and not from the concrete toward the abstract.'
Effectively the schizophrenic subject becomes like the scientist: no longer intuitively inhabiting a body and an embodied world, as it were from the inside, but inspecting it, as if an alien thing, from the outside. As Cutting writes:
'If human experience is rated on an axis of 'thingness' at one end and 'myness' at the other, then schizophrenics fall beyond normal subjects at the 'thingness' end and depressives fall beyond normal subjects at the 'myness' end.'
A schizophrenic patient says 'it is as if I am an outsider.' Objectification is reciprocally related to a sense of alienation from the world at large: objectifying alienates, alienation objectifies. Observing one's life, as a scientist might, from the outside, causes reality to change utterly. ..the lived body - the body one is - gets replaced by a deanimated anatomical entity..the corpse, the body one has."
(McGilchrist, The Matter with Things) |