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Adam Curtis HyperNormalisation BBC Documentary 2016 [22 Oct 2016|01:18am]

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Elliptic Curves [19 Oct 2016|10:09pm]

"The government's priority is to ``modernize'' the economy and the educational system, and computerized learning is supposedly one way to do this.

The U.S. computer industry has an interest in creating new markets in the Third World. Thanks to such strategies as interconnected products and planned obsolescence, greater and greater payments will flow to the North as countries like Peru become dependent on U.S. technology in more areas of national life.

Throughout the Third World, for about a decade pressure has been mounting to import computer learning from the wealthy countries.

All of the fuss about computers serves to divert attention away from the central human needs of the school system -- better conditions for teachers and better teacher training.

Like the classical Cargo Cultists, they realize that technology is associated with economic well-being, and that something must be done so that youngsters will later be able to reap the benefits of the ``computer age.'' The natural response, then, is to fetishize computers and fit them into the familiar world of traditional mindless school math."
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[17 Oct 2016|06:21pm]

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Problēma [14 Oct 2016|02:38pm]

"Latvija pieder pie kontinentālās Eiropas tiesību sistēmas"
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THE MYTH OF THE RULE OF LAW [14 Oct 2016|02:22pm]

"The truth is, of course, that both are engaging in politics. Because the law is made up of contradictory rules that can generate any conclusion, what conclusion one finds will be determined by what conclusion one looks for, i.e., by the hypothesis one decides to test. This will invariably be the one that intuitively "feels" right, the one that is most congruent with one's antecedent, underlying political and moral beliefs. Thus, legal conclusions are always determined by the normative assumptions of the decisionmaker. The knowledge that Kingsfield possesses and Arnie and Ann have not yet discovered is that the law is never neutral and objective. [..]

To have been appointed to the bench, it is virtually certain that they were both politically moderate and well-connected, and, until recently, white males of the correct ethnic and religious pedigree. It should be clear that, culturally speaking, such a group will tend to be quite homogeneous, sharing a great many moral, spiritual, and political beliefs and values. Given this, it can hardly be surprising that there will be a high degree of agreement among judges as to how cases ought to be decided. But this agreement is due to the common set of normative presuppositions the judges share, not some immanent, objective meaning that exists within the rules of law. [..]

The law appears to be stable because of the slowness with which it evolves. But the slow pace of legal development is not due to any inherent characteristic of the law itself. Logically speaking, any conclusion, however radical, is derivable from the rules of law. It is simply that, even between generations, the range of ideological opinion represented on the bench is so narrow that anything more than incremental departures from conventional wisdom and morality will not be respected within the profession. Such decisions are virtually certain to be overturned on appeal, and thus, are rarely even rendered in the first instance.

This suggests that as the ideological solidarity of the judiciary breaks down, so too does the predictability of legal decisionmaking, and hence, the stability of the law. Regardless of this trend, I hope it is now apparent that to assume that the law is stable because it is determinate is to reverse cause and effect. Rather, it is because the law is basically stable that it appears to be determinate. It is not rule of law that gives us a stable legal system; it is the stability of the culturally shared values of the judiciary that gives rise to and supports the myth of the rule of law.

The purpose of a myth is not to persuade one's reason, but to enlist one's emotions in support of an idea. And this is precisely the case for the myth of the rule of law; its purpose is to enlist the emotions of the public in support of society's political power structure.

People are more willing to support the exercise of authority over themselves when they believe it to be an objective, neutral feature of the natural world. This was the idea behind the concept of the divine right of kings. By making the king appear to be an integral part of God's plan for the world rather than an ordinary human being dominating his fellows by brute force, the public could be more easily persuaded to bow to his authority. However, when the doctrine of divine right became discredited, a replacement was needed to ensure that the public did not view political authority as merely the exercise of naked power. That replacement is the concept of the rule of law.

But the myth of the rule of law does more than render the people submissive to state authority; it also turns them into the state's accomplices in the exercise of its power. For people who would ordinarily consider it a great evil to deprive individuals of their rights or oppress politically powerless minority groups will respond with patriotic fervor when these same actions are described as upholding the rule of law.

Consider the situation in India toward the end of British colonial rule. At that time, the followers of Mohandas Gandhi engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience by manufacturing salt for their own use in contravention of the British monopoly on such manufacture. The British administration and army responded with mass imprisonments and shocking brutality. It is difficult to understand this behavior on the part of the highly moralistic, ever-so-civilized British unless one keeps in mind that they were able to view their activities not as violently repressing the indigenous population, but as upholding the rule of law.

The reason why the myth of the rule of law has survived for 100 years despite the knowledge of its falsity is that it is too valuable a tool to relinquish. The myth of impersonal government is simply the most effective means of social control available to the state.

The primary reason for this is that the public has been politically indoctrinated to fail to recognize the distinction between order and law. The state nurtures this confusion because it is the public's inability to distinguish order from law that generates its fundamental support for the state. As long as the public identifies order with law, it will believe that an orderly society is impossible without the law the state provides. And as long as the public believes this, it will continue to support the state almost without regard to how oppressive it may become.

But because the public has been conditioned to express its desire for order as one for law, all calls for a more orderly society are interpreted as calls for more law. And since under our current political system, all law is supplied by the state, all such calls are interpreted as calls for a more active and powerful state.

The law is an amalgam of contradictory rules and counter-rules expressed in inherently vague language that can yield a legitimate legal argument for any desired conclusion. For this reason, as long as the law remains a state monopoly, it will always reflect the political ideology of those invested with decision-making power. Like it or not, we are faced with only two choices. We can continue the ideological power struggle for control of the law in which the group that gains dominance is empowered to impose its will on the rest of society, or we can end the monopoly."
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[11 Oct 2016|06:18pm]

"Czech, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, the Baltics…, East Europe that lies on the line between the North Sea and the Black Sea — these are the places that always see the worst of trans-European war. This is such a significant and well defined trend in history that there is a name for the place: The Intermarum.

A few years ago Czech, Hungary and Poland broke with European defense policy (a worthless concept unless an American general or President is doing the talking) and formed their own for-real military alliance called the Visegard Group. While European NATO members argue about who is going to pay for what during a projected training exercise the East Europeans are sending their tiny military forces out to the training range on their own. So the Intermarum has now organized itself into a tiny military alliance that isn’t about building bigger and nicer offices for itself in Belgium every year on American tax money. Compared to the last seven decades of abject military complacency and external domination this is quite a break from the status quo.

When France or Germany invades Russia or Russia invades anywhere in Europe, they march through Poland and Czech and have to deploy mountain troops to Slovakia, Czech and Hungary and at least fight a blocking action in Romania. These countries have no direct input on the reasons France or Germany and Russia might be at war, but they are the battlegrounds where the blood is actually spilt and fighting is heaviest. This is, of course, devastating since the combined might of two modern armies always clashes right there in Eastern Europe. The speedbumps always see the worst wear.

[..] East Europe was pulverized in 1938 and remained a impact zone (literally — as in bullets, shells and bombs impacting it) for seven more years until 1945, at which point the Russian reaction to German invasion was a counter-invasion of Germany, which meant invading back across East Europe on its way to Germany. East Europe got screwed. Twice. The place was completely devastated and much of it actually flattened.

After all that East Europe didn’t get straightened out for 60 more years because the Soviets needed East Europe as a buffer zone against the American military in Europe. They didn’t have any need to improve the area, of course, they just needed to hold it for use as a surrogate battlefield in the event of WWIII, because battlegrounds are horrible places and they would much prefer the horrors occur there than in Russia itself.

Considering how geography forces those historical realities on the Intermarum countries it is easy to see why the Euroskeptic, anti-collectivist, pro-American Constitutionalism part of Europe happens to be East Europe. [..]

There really isn’t any separation between politics, economics and war from a geopolitical perspective and the East Europeans are worried that the American system, which has enabled the European system to exist for the last two generations, is on its way toward a type of dysfunction which will require the Americans to withdraw their concrete forms of attention from European affairs due to lack of resources and/or political bandwidth. We would withhold our attention and resources the same way the vascular system withholds blood from the extremities when threatened or ill.

An American decline, the definite separation of French and German interest from the made-up concept of “the European interest” and the resurgence of Russia is alarming to the Czechs and especially the Poles for reasons that people not familiar with history, geopolitics and the logistics of war do not understand."
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