The initiatives thus presuppose a system of unequal representation in the institutions of the economy and in politics. Unequal representation gives more political weight to 'technocratic' cadres: neoclassical economists, financial administrators and central bankers, who are hardly representative of broader societal interests. The least democratic levels of governance in the emerging multi-level system tend to be, on the one hand, in local government (where participation often tends to be quite low) and, more acutely, at the level of regional and global governance in, for example, the European Commission and the international financial institutions, where there are significant 'democratic deficits'.
Because of the pressures of Maastricht, some EU national governments, which are more accountable to electorates than is the European Commission, may be tempted to resort to government by decree if normal measures to gain support for their policies fail. An extreme example of this logic, that of subordinating democracy to the dictates of a neoliberal restructuring of state finances, was seen in Belgium in 1996. Here we witnessed a peculiar combination of austerity and absolutism in order to meet EMU convergence criteria.32 The future may be worse. As the prominent US economist Richard Cooper has put it,
'Maastricht...creates a body of Platonic monetary guardians, accountable to no one, to frame and execute one of the most important aspects of policy in modern economies, affecting hundreds of millions of people. This was done in the name of insulating monetary policy—and its primary objective of price stability—from political pressure, and of endowing the new European central bank with political independence.'
In this context EMU has come to have a peculiar political logic, which to be charitable could be described as Homeric: in order to return safely home while on his long 10-year journey, Odysseus insisted on being bound to the mast (of fiscal and monetary rectitude) so he would not be lured by the song of the Sirens (and debauch the currency). In political terms, the effect of such measures, when implemented, would be to prohibit a wide range of policies to defend national or local interests. Indeed, many redistributive policies that a more ecologically and socially orientated government might seek to promote would be made more difficult or even illegal. These measures could be opposed as constituting a restraint of trade or freedom of investment or the right of repatriation of profits, and so on.
Stephen Gill (1998): European governance and new constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and
alternatives to disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe, New Political Economy, 3:1, 5-26